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THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES AFTER
RANDOLPH: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER POLICE
REMOVAL OF AN OBJECTING TENANT
Matthew W J Webb*
In Georgia v. Randolph, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, where two
occupants of a home disagree over whether to grant police permission to
search, the "physicallypresent co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry
prevails." Courts are now split, however, over whether police may
nevertheless conduct a warrantlesssearch with the consent of one resident
after a co-occupant who expressly denies consent is arrestedand removed
by the police. This Note examines the rationales of those U.S. courts of
appeals that have confronted these circumstances and ultimately concludes
that the Supreme Court's complicated-and sometimes contradictory-Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not offer a satisfactory solution to
the problem. In its place, this Note offers a different approach to thirdparty consent cases, advocating a division between two distinct types of
searches: investigative consent searches and searches invited by a citizen
in distress.
INTRODUCTION

On July 16, 2001, Scott Randolph's wife called the police to report a
domestic disturbance at her home.'
When the police arrived, Janet
Randolph accused her husband of using "large amounts of cocaine" and of
taking their child away from the home, which led the police to request
consent to search the house. 2 Scott Randolph refused to consent to a
search, but his wife allowed police inside and led the officers to an upstairs
room, where they recovered a straw that contained cocaine residue. 3 After
police seized the cocaine straw, Mrs. Randolph withdrew her consent to
search the home, but the officers were able to procure a warrant based on
the initial seizure. 4 During the ensuing search of the entire home, police
seized further drug-related items. 5 At trial, Scott Randolph moved to
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law. Thank you to Professor Fabio
Arcila for his guidance, insight, and feedback throughout this process, and to my wife and
family for their unwavering support and encouragement.
1. Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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suppress the seized evidence on the grounds that the search "over his
express objection violated his Fourth Amendment rights," but his motion
6
was denied.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Georgia v. Randolph,7 held that "a
physically present co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry prevails,
rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him."'8
Thus, the search of Randolph's home violated the Fourth Amendment.
Randolph is easy to apply in circumstances identical to those that faced the
police on Scott Randolph's doorstep, but courts are now beginning to
struggle with variations on that fact pattern.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently referred to
Randolph in deciding United States v. Hudspeth,9 a case that began when
Missouri state police, investigating the sale of pseudoephedrine-based cold
tablets, executed a search warrant on Roy Hudspeth's business.' 0 During
the search of the office, the officers came across compact discs (CDs)
containing child pornography and requested Hudspeth's permission to
search his home computer. 1 Hudspeth refused and was arrested and
transported to the county jail.12 Despite Hudspeth's refusal, the police went
to his home, where they met Georgia Hudspeth, Roy's wife. 13 Mrs.
Hudspeth eventually consented to the police request to seize the home
computer. 14 The police found additional child pornography, which was
introduced at trial.15 Hudspeth argued that Randolph mandated suppression
of the evidence, 16 but the trial court rejected this claim, and the Eighth
Circuit eventually affirmed.' 7 Roy Hudspeth was sentenced to five years
8
imprisonment. '
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also considered
Randolph in deciding United States v. Henderson.19 In that case, police
arrived at Kevin Henderson's home in response to a 911 call made by his
wife, Patricia, who claimed that her husband had choked her and thrown her
out of the house.2 0 Mrs. Henderson gave the police a key to the house,
whereupon they entered and found Kevin Henderson in his living room. 2 1
6. Id.
7. 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
8. Id. at 1519.
9. 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008).
10. United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006), rev'd in part, affd in
part en banc, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008).
11. Id. at 925.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.at 926.
16. Letter Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 4-5, Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922 (No. 05-3316).

17. United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 2008).
18. Appellant's Opening Brief at i, Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922 (No. 05-3316).
19. 536 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008).
20. United States v. Henderson, No. 04 CR 697, 2006 WL 3469538, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 29, 2006), rev'd, 536 F.3d 776.
21. Id.
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Although Henderson immediately ordered the officers out of his house, they
arrested him and removed him from the scene. 22 Patricia Henderson
consented to a search of the home and helped the officers find drugs and
weapons. 23 Kevin Henderson moved to suppress the evidence, relying on
the Supreme Court's holding in Randolph, and the trial court granted the
motion.24 However, the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the case was
distinguishable from Randolph and that Henderson's objection to the search
lost its force once he was arrested and removed from the scene. 25 Kevin
on September 17, 2008,
Henderson filed a petition for a rehearing en banc
26
Circuit.
Seventh
the
by
decision
a
awaiting
is
and
Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found Randolph
to be relevant to its analysis in United States v. Murphy.27 Police officers
conducting a drug investigation knocked on Stephen Murphy's storage unit
door and requested permission to search the premises. Although Murphy
refused, the officers could see a methamphetamine lab in plain view and
therefore arrested him. 28 Later that day, the police were able to obtain
consent to search from another individual who had given Murphy
permission to use the storage unit. 29 The district court-before Randolph
was decided-denied Murphy's motion to suppress the evidence and then
refused Murphy's request to reconsider after the Supreme Court's
decision. 30 Murphy was sentenced to ten years imprisonment before the
Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, in light of Randolph, the warrantless
search of the3 storage unit after Murphy's objection violated the Fourth
Amendment. 1
This Note examines how the circuit courts apply--or refuse to applyRandolph to situations where an individual who refuses to consent to a
warrantless search is removed from the scene by police officers, only to
have his refusal overridden by a co-tenant or co-occupant. Part I reviews
the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the basis for the
Supreme Court's consent search doctrine, focusing on the Court's landmark
third-party consent search cases: United States v. Matlock,32 Illinois v.
Rodriguez,33 and Georgia v. Randolph. Part II provides a detailed analysis
of the conflict that has developed among the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits over whether Randolph requires suppression of any evidence
obtained from a warrantless consent search where one occupant, although
22. Id.

23. Henderson, 536 F.3d at 777.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 783-84.

26. Defendant-Appellee's Petition for Rehearing with a Suggestion for Rehearing En
Banc, Henderson, 536 F.3d 776 (No. 04 CR 697).
27. 516 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008).
28. Id. at 1119.
29. Id. at 1120.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1125.
32. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
33. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
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not physically present at the time of the search, expressly refuses to consent
before being removed by police officers. Part III argues that the "widely
shared social expectations" 34 analysis used in Randolph is fundamentally
flawed and a primary cause of the current circuit split. This part also argues
for use of Professor Jed Rubenfeld's "test of generalizability" to develop a
new understanding of third-party consent searches. In particular, Part III
advocates for recognition of a significant distinction between cases where
police seek consent as a result of their own independent investigations, and
those where a citizen requesting police assistance grants officers consent to
search. Where police are in an investigative, rather than protective role,
they should be required to have probable cause and obtain a warrant in
order to search, rather than requesting consent from a third party.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK: PROPERTY, PRIVACY,
SECURITY, AND THE ABILITY TO CONSENT

This part outlines the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
from the Framers' original intent to the modem-day conception of the
amendment as protecting reasonable expectations of privacy. In addition, it
provides an overview of the consent search doctrine, focusing on the
Supreme Court's decisions in third-party consent search cases.
A. OriginalIntent and CurrentApplication of the FourthAmendment
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."' 35 The meaning of the
amendment has long been debated by scholars and judges, and the Supreme
Court's decisions in this area have been anything but clarifying, leading one
scholar to comment that "[a]lmost no one has a kind word to say about
fourth amendment jurisprudence." 36 Another commentator described the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment decisions as "a mass of contradictions
and obscurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in such a way that every
'3 7
effort to extract themselves only finds them more profoundly stuck.
1. Original Intent
The debate begins with the question of what protections the Framers
intended the Fourth Amendment to provide. The Supreme Court has
34. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1521 (2006).

35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 19 (1988). The authors further note that "there is
virtual unanimity, transcending normal ideological dispute, that the Court simply has made a
mess of search and seizure law." Id. at 20.
37. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468,
1468 (1985).
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recently begun mandating that the Framers' intent should guide any Fourth
Amendment analysis, suggesting that courts look to the laws of the
founding era in order to determine whether a particular search or seizure
would have been considered illegal. 38 However, Professor Thomas Davies
conducted a comprehensive review of the historical basis for the Fourth
Amendment and determined that its entire purpose was to abolish general
warrants. 39 A general warrant is one that "lacks a sufficiently particularized
'40
description of the... thing to be seized or the place to be searched."
According to Davies, the Framers' primary concern was not the warrantless
searches and seizures that tend to be the subject of modern Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, but was instead searches of homes under the
color of a general warrant. 4 1 In the late eighteenth century, "[p]roactive
criminal law enforcement had not yet developed," and officers of the law
had extremely limited discretionary authority. 42 Further, beyond the limited
police powers of state officers, "the common law already specified that
many sorts of arrests or searches could only be justified by a valid
warrant-especially when 'houses, papers, and effects' were involved." 43
The modern understanding of the Fourth Amendment, that it "generally
prohibits the warrantless entry of a person's home, ' 44 is in fact an
adaptation of the text of the Constitution required "to meet the needs of a
38. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1602 (2008) ("In determining whether
a search or seizure is unreasonable, we begin with history. We look to the statutes and
common law of the founding era to determine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was
meant to preserve."); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999) ("In deciding whether a
challenged governmental action violates the Amendment, we have taken care to inquire
whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search and seizure when the Amendment
was framed."); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) ("In evaluating the scope of
this right, we have looked to the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing."). But see David A.
Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1739, 1743-44
(2000) ("[This] new understanding [of the Fourth Amendment] has little to recommend
it .... Neither the text nor the background of the Fourth Amendment suggests it aims
merely to codify eighteenth-century rules of search and seizure.").
39. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REv. 547, 649-50 (1999) (asserting that the Framers "perceived the task for the
constitutional text solely as banning the legalization of general warrants"). For another view
on the original purpose of the Fourth Amendment, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment
FirstPrinciples, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 801 (1994) (arguing that "[t]he core of the Fourth
Amendment... is neither a warrant nor probable cause, but reasonableness").
40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1616 (8th ed. 2004); see also Davies, supra note 39, at

558 (suggesting that "general warrant" is "a framing-era term for an unparticularized warrant
(for example, ordering a search of 'suspected places'), which was also commonly applied to
a warrant lacking a complaint under oath or an adequate showing of cause").
41. Davies, supra note 39, at 601 (noting that, although "[m]odern search and seizure
law has become preoccupied with warrantless arrests and searches[,] .

. .

. the Framers

focused their concerns and complaints rather precisely on searches of houses under general
warrants").
42. Id. at 620 ("[T]he common law did not provide officers with discretionary search
and seizure authority.").
43. Id. at 649.
44. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (citing Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)).
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more populous, heterogeneous, and urbanized society" 45 that is policed by
officers with greater discretionary authority. 46 Further, the generalized
principle of reasonableness, often invoked to determine whether a particular
search violates the Fourth Amendment, 47 also is not supported by an
historical understanding of the Framers' use of the word "unreasonable" in
'48
the text, which was intended to be synonymous with "general warrant.
2. The Modem Conception of the Fourth Amendment's Primary
Protection: Property, Privacy, or Security?
Clearly, the Fourth Amendment has come to mean significantly more
than simply a protection against general warrants. While the precise target
three potential candidates
or scope of its protections are not always clear, 49
can be identified: property, privacy, and security.

In 1928, the Supreme Court declared that the Fourth Amendment is only
violated when the state unlawfully searches or seizes tangible, real
property. 50 In a famous dissent, Justice Louis Brandeis strongly disputed
the notion that the Fourth Amendment could only be invoked to protect
intrusions against property, instead arguing that "every unjustifiable
the individual.., must be
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of
51
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."

45. Davies, supra note 39, at 747.
46. Id. The view that the Fourth Amendment should be adaptable to modem needs was
championed by Justice Louis Brandeis in his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis argued that "[c]lauses
guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of power[] must have a
similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world." Id. at 472.
47. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (noting that "[a]n
automobile stop is . . . subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be 'unreasonable'
under the circumstances"); Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183 (a defendant is "assured... that
no ... search will occur that is 'unreasonable' (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV)); Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (asserting that "it is a 'basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable" (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 477
(1971))); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (noting the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to "safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with
privacy").
48. Davies, supra note 39, at 693 (noting that the term "unreasonable" was used in the
legal context as a "pejorative synonym for gross illegality or unconstitutionality," that is,
"searches ... made under that most illegal pretense of authority-general warrants").
49. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy,
or Security, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 308 (1998) (asserting that "there are three
possible candidates for defining the scope of the amendment's protections: property,
privacy, and security").
50. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding that there must be "an official search and seizure
of... tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of [the defendant's] house");
see also Clancy, supra note 49, at 312 (noting that, "beginning with Olmstead v. United
States, the Court used property law to define constitutionally protected areas and limited the
Fourth Amendment inquiry to the protection of tangible items from physical invasions of
real property").
51. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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The Court adopted Justice Brandeis's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment in the landmark 1967 case Katz v. United States, 52 which
overruled Olmstead v. United States.53 Charles Katz was convicted of
illegal gambling after the Federal Bureau of Investigation placed a listening
device on the outside of a public phone booth and recorded a telephone call
he made to place bets. 54 The Court held that Katz was reasonably justified
55
in expecting this call to remain private.
Thus, despite the fact that the word "privacy" is nowhere to be found in
the text of the amendment, the Court now understands "reasonable
expectation[s] of privacy" to be implicitly protected. 56 The problem
inherent in this style of analysis is obvious: if the Court is the arbiter of
what is a reasonable expectation of privacy, then "someone can have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in an area if and only if the Court has
held that a search in that area would be unreasonable." 57 Nevertheless, the
Katz decision "placed privacy at the heart of the fourth amendment,"
dispelling the notion that the amendment governed only the seizure of
tangible property. 58 As seen in Georgia v. Randolph,59 however, property
interests did not become irrelevant to Fourth Amendment law but are
instead one factor that could contribute to an individual's expectation of
60
privacy.
In fact, scholars debate whether Katz actually signaled a change in Fourth
Amendment analysis, or if it was actually more of a "revolution on paper
than in practice." 6 1 Professor Orin Kerr argues that, although courts
continue to refer to "reasonable expectation[s] of privacy," those
expectations are only considered "reasonable" and therefore protected by
the Fourth Amendment, when "backed by a right to exclude borrowed from
real property law." 62 The real change signaled by Katz, Kerr argues, was a
shift from reliance on the strict common law of property and trespass to a

52. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
53. 277 U.S. 438; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 ("We conclude that the underpinnings
of Olmstead... have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine

there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.").
54. Id. at 348.
55. Id. at 352.
56. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978) (reinforcing the Katz formulation: the "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment depends . . .upon whether the person who claims the protection of the
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place").
57. Michael Abramowicz, ConstitutionalCircularity,49 UCLA L. REv. 1, 61 (2001).
58. Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of

Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1593, 1593 (1987).
59. See infra Part I.C.3.
60. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1517 (2006) (noting that "widely shared
social expectations ...are influenced by property law but not controlled by its rules").
61. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths
and the Casefor Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 807 (2004).
62. Id. at 809-10.
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"looser property-based approach," 63 which "tracks property principles but
doesn't embrace common law property technicalities." 64 Even Katz can
easily be understood as a protection of property rights, rather than privacy,
because the Court notes that Katz "pa[id] the toll that permit[ted] him to
place a call," 6 5 thus obtaining a property interest in the phone booth by
renting it out "much like a hotel guest rents out a ...room for the night."'66
Professor Sherry Colb disputes the premise of Kerr's argument, finding it
"peculiar that the Court would pursue a property-based approach to the
Fourth Amendment .. .and simultaneously pay lip service to a privacy-

based approach."'6 7 Initially, Colb does not find the lack of textual support
for a protection of privacy in the Fourth Amendment troubling because
"[t]he right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, in
historical context ... necessarily encompassed privacy.

'6 8

Suggesting that

"[t]here has long been significant overlap between property rights and
reasonable expectations of privacy," Professor Colb argues that, at the time
of the framing, it would have been possible to protect privacy effectively by
guaranteeing the people a right of security in their houses, papers, and
effects: "[s]uch an amendment would automatically cover privacy interests
as well."' 69

In other words, it would have been redundant to explicitly

protect privacy rights in the Fourth Amendment. 70 Those cases that Kerr
sees as neglecting privacy rights that are not associated with property
rights, 71 Colb understands as implicating both privacy and property
interests, which the Court failed to protect because it applied an
"assumption of the risk" approach that erroneously equates "risk of
exposure with actual exposure." 72 Fundamentally, Colb argues that "Fourth
Amendment doctrine does not purport to protect privacy merely when it is
63. Id. at 816. Orin Kerr suggests that Justice John Marshall Harlan's reasonable
expectation of privacy test, instead of being a "'watershed in fourth amendment
jurisprudence,"' was merely an articulation of a "legal standard that the Court had been
tacitly applying in past cases." Id. at 820 (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 382 (1974)).
64. Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/
1 131496047.shtml (Nov. 8, 2005, 18:27 EST).
65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
66. Kerr, supra note 61, at 822.
67. Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why PropertyDoes Not Define the Limits
of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REv. 889, 893

(2004).
68. Id. at 895.
69. Id. at 894-95.
70. Id. (noting that "it would not have seemed necessary to the framers and ratifiers of
the Fourth Amendment to craft a separate amendment to protect the privacy that did not arise
from a property right").
71. See Kerr, supra note 61, at 824 (citing several cases decided post-Katz that are "hard
to square" with the notion that Katz fundamentally changed the framework for Fourth
Amendment analysis, such as Californiav. HodariD., 499 U.S. 621 (1991); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); and United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971)).

72. See Colb, supra note 67, at 898 (arguing that the issues raised in the cases cited by
Kerr "directly implicat[e] interests in property as well as privacy").
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tied to property, but actually, and appropriately (if imperfectly), protects
73

privacy."
Some commentators, while acknowledging the role privacy has come to
play in the Court's analysis, nevertheless insist that this focus is misplaced
74
and neglects the core protection of the Fourth Amendment: security.
Professor Thomas Clancy argues that the security protected by the Fourth
Amendment ensures the right of the "individual to exclude the government
from unreasonably intruding" 7 5 into the specific objects listed in the text:
"persons, houses, papers, and effects."'76 In Clancy's view, the Court has
"used privacy analysis not to expand protected individual interests, but to
reduce the scope of the amendment's protections. '7 7 Because the privacy
analysis has no basis in the text of the amendment, it is subject "to the
vagaries of shifting Court majorities, which are able to manipulate the
concept to either expand or contract the meaning of the word at will."' 78
Most importantly, "the privacy theory ... fail[s] to grasp the essence of the
interest protected. '79 Clancy argues that an individual might invoke the
Fourth Amendment in order to protect his or her own privacy, but "the
individual's motivation is not the right protected"; instead, the "right
protected" is the right to exclude. 80 This right is inextricably linked to an
individual's property interest in whatever is being intruded upon, be it his
home, papers, or person. The proper analysis, therefore, is to ask initially
"whether the papers or personal property are mine, whether the house is
mine, whether the body is mine? If the answer is yes, then one has the right
to exclude the government from searching or seizing." 8 1
Professor Jed Rubenfeld similarly argues that courts should look more
carefully at the text of the Fourth Amendment and consider what the
'82
Framers intended with the phrase "[t]he right of the people to be secure.

73. Id. at 903.
74. See Clancy, supra note 49, at 308; Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L.
REv. 101, 104 (2008).
75. Clancy, supra note 49, at 308.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
77. Clancy, supra note 49, at 331.
78. Id. at 339.
79. Id. at 367.
80. Id. at 354. "The meaning of security will vary somewhat in relation to the protected
interest specified by the amendment .... However, the core concept remains the right to
exclude." Id. at 356-57. Illustrating this point, Thomas Clancy asks the reader to imagine a
glass house. Id. at 360. Because the interior of the house is completely visible from the
outside, a privacy analysis might conclude that "the owner does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the house or in the conduct of his activities in the
house." Id. at 360. However, "[i]f the protected interest is defined as the right to exclude,"
the owner retains the right to exclude a physical invasion. Id. at 360-61; see also Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 209 (1961) ("The essence of the liberty protected by the common law
and by the American constitutions was 'the right to shut the door on officials of the state
unless their entry is under proper authority of law'; particularly, 'the right to resist
unauthorized entry."' (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959))).
81. Clancy, supra note 49, at 368-69.
82. Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 119 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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However, Rubenfeld rejects Clancy's definition of security as the right to
83
exclude, offering a different interpretation.
Rubenfeld argues that the central function of the amendment is "to
navigate the minefield between too much and too little police power." 84 By
focusing on privacy, courts have emphasized "an individual's comfort,
dignity, tranquility, respectability, and fear of embarrassment," 85 instead of
the "distinctive needs, responsibilities, and dangers of the government's
awesome law enforcement power." 86 The most dangerous harm that a
government unencumbered by the Fourth Amendment might inflict is not
an individual detention or invasion of privacy;8 7 it is instead the collective
effect of these intrusions on our society as a whole. 88 Rubenfeld notes that
the Fourth Amendment differs significantly from the criminal procedure
guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, in that it is directed toward
"the people," rather than an individual rightsholder. 89 This choice of
wording was not an example of the Framers' "grammatical excess," 90 but
instead was a clear indication of their concern with the effect of warrantless
intrusions on American citizens' collective ability to live in freedom
91
without a "pervasive, cringing fear of the state."
In order to enforce this right, Rubenfeld proposes a "test of
generalizability" that looks to how a particular warrantless government
92
search or seizure, if left unchecked, would affect society collectively.
Each search or seizure upheld by the Supreme Court "confer[s] on the state
a general license to search or seize" in similar circumstances in the future,
clearly affecting society in general. 93 Those searches or seizures that, when
generalized to the society as a whole, would destroy "the security of lawabiding people," should be subject to probable cause and the warrant
94
requirement.
The debate among commentators over the original intent of the Framers
and the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth Amendment is, of
course, ongoing. The broad issues of privacy, property, and security run
through all aspects of Fourth Amendment analysis, including discussions of
so-called "consent searches," which are often considered an exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The next section reviews the
development of the Supreme Court's consent search jurisprudence.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

105 n.16.
119.
117.
119.
126-27.
127 ("The fundamental constitutional harm created by systematic suspicion-

based arrests and searches is the pervasive and profound insecurity such measures inflict on
the people as a whole.").
89. Id. at 120.
90. Id. at 121.
91. Id. at 127.
92. Id. at 131.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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B. A FourthAmendment Exception: Warrantless Consent Searches

The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of privacy within
the home. 95 In fact, the home is the most clearly defined "zone of privacy"
protected by the Fourth Amendment, which "unequivocally establishes...
'the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.' . . . Absent exigent circumstances,
that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. '96 The
Court's use of the phrase "absent exigent circumstances" makes clear that
there are recognized exceptions to the rule that a warrantless search is "per
se unreasonable." 97
The exceptions are described as "specifically
established and well-delineated" 9 8 and "jealously and carefully drawn," 99
but they nevertheless allow the government to circumvent the warrant
requirement and enter a home without the involvement of an "impartial
magistrate."' 0 0 Randolph, and the current conflict under discussion, is the
product of one of these exceptions: voluntary consent.
1. Consent Searches: Voluntary Waiver or Reasonable Police Conduct?
The Supreme Court recognizes that "a search pursuant to consent ... is a
constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police
activity."''
In fact, the police probably rely on voluntary consent more
10 2
than any other method of executing a search without a warrant.
10 3
Nevertheless, the precise basis for consent searches is somewhat murky,
and Professor Tracey Maclin identifies three separate doctrinal foundations
for consent searches:
(1) that consent creates an exception to the
95. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting
that "it is beyond dispute that the home is entitled to special protection as the center of the
private lives of our people"); Davies, supra note 39, at 642 (suggesting that "modem
courts ... acknowledge that the house was meant to receive special protection" by the
Fourth Amendment); Stephanie M. Godfrey & Kay Levine, Much Ado About Randolph:
The Supreme Court Revisits Third Party Consent, 42 TULSA L. REv. 731, 732 (2007) ("Of
particular importance to the framers was preservation of the home as a place of refuge and
safety.").
96. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
97. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
98. Id.
99. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
100. Id. at 498.
101. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
102. See Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211,214

(2001) (claiming that "there is no dispute that [consent] searches affect tens of thousands, if
not hundreds of thousands, of people every year"); Daniel R. Williams, Misplaced Angst:
Another Look at Consent-Search Jurisprudence,82 IND. L.J. 69, 69 (2007) (asserting that
consent searches are "the most common type of warrantless searches law enforcement
officers conduct").
103. Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme
Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REv. 27, 29 (2008) (noting that "[a]nother bewildering aspect of the
law of consent searches is exactly where such searches belong in the Court's Fourth
Amendment framework").
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requirements of the Fourth Amendment; 104 (2) that no exception is
required, because consent searches are not in fact "searches" protected by
the Fourth Amendment, as the individual has chosen not to exercise his or
her constitutional rights; 10 5 and (3) that consent is not a per se exception to
the warrant requirement because the Fourth Amendment requires only that a
warrantless search be "reasonable,"' 1 6 which it must be if permission is
granted. 107
In early consent cases, "[a] citizen's consent to a police intrusion was
understood to waive ... the privacy interest of the citizen that otherwise
would be protected under the Fourth Amendment." 10 8 However, because
the Supreme Court eventually determined that a valid waiver must be both
knowing and intelligent, 10 9 this conception of consent could not survive the
Court's decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,110 which held that, although
an individual's consent to a search must be voluntary, it need not be made
with the knowledge that consent may be refused. 111 In Schneckloth, the
Court decided that "[t]here is a vast difference between those rights that
protect a fair criminal trial," to which waiver protections apply, "and the
rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment."1 1 2 Thus, the Court
determined that there was no reason to extend the "'knowing' and
'intelligent"' requirement to consent searches. 113
14
By removing "waiver" from the consent search doctrine vocabulary,"
the Schneckloth Court began the trend toward focusing on the
"reasonableness" of the circumstances surrounding the search and the
actions of the police officers, rather than a waiver of rights as the basis for
104. See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 ("It is . . . well settled that one of the
specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause
is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.").
105. See Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by DisregardingDoctrine: How Illinois v.
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and
Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error,59 TENN. L. REv. 1, 27 (1991) (arguing that
"the Court viewed consent as taking a police intrusion outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment").
106. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-84 (1990) ("What... is assured
by the Fourth Amendment itself... is not that no government search of his house will occur
unless he consents; but that no such search will occur that is 'unreasonable."' (internal
citations omitted)).
107. See Maclin, supra note 103, at 29.
108. Davies, supra note 105, at 26-27.
109. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492-93 (1966) (citing Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1963); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948)).
110. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
111. Id. at 234 ("[Nleither this Court's prior cases, nor the traditional definition of
'voluntariness' requires proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an
effective consent to a search.").
112. Id. at241.
113. Id.; see also Davies, supra note 105, at 31 ("Schneckloth edited 'waiver' out of the
Court's vocabulary of synonyms for consent to avoid any suggestion that consent required a
warning of the fight to withhold consent.").
114. See Davies, supra note 105, at 32 (noting that, in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164 (1974), "the leading decision regarding third-party consent," the Court pointedly
refrained from using the word "waiver").
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consent searches."l 5 Illinois v. Rodriguez represented a significant
116
hardening of that theory.
2. Consent and Coercion
Several scholars strongly criticize the Supreme Court's refusal to
mandate knowing and intelligent consent. Professor Marcy Strauss argues
that "many people, if not most, will always feel coerced by police 'requests'
to search. To most people, the request to search will be considered an
uncontrovertible demand to search."' '7 Strauss suggests that people
regularly consent to searches of their homes or cars, despite full knowledge
that incriminating evidence will almost certainly be found, because a
request made by a law enforcement officer is received as a demand that
must be obeyed.' 18 Strauss argues that this is particularly true among
African American and other minority communities, where "a court's nimble
assertion that a person can 'just say no' to a police request to search is a
sorry, empty slogan" because of a history of unpleasant and coercive
interactions with police officers.' 19
The "totality of ...the ... circumstances" 1 20 test that the Supreme Court

passed down to determine whether consent is truly voluntary exacerbates
the problem by essentially making the question of voluntariness a
"swearing contest" between the defendant and police.' 2 1 A judge is left to
weigh the credibility of a defendant who claims his consent was coerced
against that of a police officer who testifies that the consent was wholly
voluntary. Strauss argues that, in these situations, judges are more
"inclined to accept the testimony of a police officer," rather than the
22
defendant. 1
Ultimately, Strauss concludes that "stop gap measures" to improve the
consent search process, such as requiring that individuals be informed that
they may refuse to consent or requiring judges to consider individual
subjective factors more fully when determining whether consent was truly
voluntary, are not adequate. 123 Professor Strauss argues for the "drastic
solution"' 124 of eliminating consent searches entirely, arguing that there is
115. Coombs, supra note 58, at 1640 (noting that "the Court determined that the consent
made the search reasonable and therefore valid"); Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" but Still
Reasonable: A New Paradigmfor Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND.
L.J. 773, 785-86 (2005) ("[U]nder the rationale of Schneckloth... the Court's actual inquiry
in evaluating consent searches is into the reasonableness of the police officer's actions.").
116. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-84 (1990) (holding that "[t]here are various
elements ...that can make a search of a person's house 'reasonable'-one of which is the
consent of the person or his cotenant").
117. See Strauss, supra note 102, at 221.
118. Id. at 240-41.
119. Id. at 244.
120. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
121. See Strauss, supra note 102, at 245.
122. Id. at 246-47.
123. Id. at 271.
124. Id.
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very little empirical evidence to support the assertion that consent searches
enhance law enforcement and crime fighting.' 25 Strauss instead asserts that
police officers gain only "a minimal efficiency advantage from consent
searches," because in many cases they already have probable cause to
search and simply "don't want to go to the 'trouble' of getting a
26
warrant."1
Professor George Thomas also points to the absurdity of suggesting that a
suspect would truly give voluntary consent to a search of his person, car, or
home with full knowledge that contraband will be found. 127 As an example
of this phenomenon, Thomas points to United States v. Drayton,128 where
police boarded a bus and informed passengers that they were conducting a
routine drug and weapons investigation. 129 They asked Christopher
Drayton and Clifton Brown, who were sitting next to each other, about their
luggage and asked for their permission to search it. 130 They both
consented, but no drugs were found. 131 Next, the officers asked Brown for
permission to search his person. 132 He again consented, and police found
drug packages concealed in his pants; Brown was arrested and removed
from the bus. 133 The officers then turned to Drayton who, despite just
seeing his companion arrested for the drugs on his person, consented to a
search. 134 Again, drugs were found, and Drayton was arrested. 135 The
district court concluded that there was nothing coercive in the
confrontation, and the Supreme Court agreed. 136 Thomas argues that "[i]t
137 It
borders on ludicrous to say that Drayton consented" to the search.
38
seems clear that Drayton would only consent if he felt he had no choice.'
Arguing that "[d]efining 'consent' as the lack of overt coercion is a pretty
impoverished notion when one is facing armed police," 139 Thomas
suggests a solution that would require police to have probable cause before
requesting consent to search.' 40 Although this requirement would lead "to

125. Id. at 260 ("Although police officers undoubtedly gain at least a minimal efficiency
advantage from consent searches, the magnitude of these interests are unclear. Nowhere
have any of these arguments been empirically validated.").
126. Id. at 260-61.
127. George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison
Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1451, 1505-

13 (2005).
128. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
129. Id. at 197-98.
130. Id. at 198-99.
131. Id. at 199.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 200, 207-08.
137. Thomas, supra note 127, at 1509.
138. Id.

139. Id. at 1510.
140. Id. at 1512.
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the abolition of consent as a freestanding justification for a search,' 4 1 he
argues that requiring individualized suspicion for a consent request is
consistent with the original intent of the Framers, who expressed concern
that state agents would use their office, backed by the federal government,
to force searches upon citizens. 142 Although the authors of the Constitution
did not speak to consent-based searches specifically, Thomas suggests that
this silence should not be construed as approval. Instead, it is evidence that
relinquishing property at the request of a "lowly constable" was so
143
unreasonable that it never crossed their minds.
Professor Tracey Maclin, while acknowledging that "there are strong
arguments supporting banning consent searches completely," puts forth a
different solution, 144 which goes directly to the issue raised in Randolph,
Hudspeth, Murphy, and Henderson. Maclin suggests that "whenever a
person objects or refuses to provide consent . ..that refusal should bar

further attempts by the police to seek consent." 14 5 There are parallels
between this proposal and the rule that already applies to police
interrogations: police cannot continue to question a suspect after he asks
for counsel. 146 Maclin suggests that the rationales for the right-to-counsel
rule-"[to] end police badgering, provide guidance to police, and.., help
suspects who feel uncomfortable dealing with police interrogation by
themselves"-are also applicable in the consent search context. 14 7 A per se
rule requiring police to respect a refusal of consent would "discourage
police badgering of persons, provide guidance to lower courts and police
officers

. . .

and, most importantly, protect the Fourth Amendment rights of

persons who are uncomfortable dealing with police-citizen encounters and
who believe that police officers will not honor their refusal to allow consent
searches."' 148 Ultimately, police should not be encouraged to engage in
tactics that are "designed to undermine the person's initial assertion of his
rights"' 149 by continuing to attempt to gain the consent that they were
explicitly denied.
Despite these suggestions from scholars, the Supreme Court has shown
no sign of revising the rule announced in Schneckloth. In fact, as the cases
discussed below suggest, the consent search doctrine has expanded, rather
than narrowed, since that decision.

141. Id. at 1518.
142. Id. at 1477; see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in
Assessing the Reasonablenessof Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 483, 634 (1995)

(arguing that individualized suspicion was of "central importance" to the Framers and that
"[e]xceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion should only be justified by a
showing of necessity, which is to say that exceptions to that requirement should be few").
143. Thomas, supra note 127, at 1518.
144. See Maclin, supra note 103, at 78-79.
145. Id. at 80.
146. Id. at 80-81.
147. Id. at 81.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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C. Consentfrom a Third Party
Initially, the consent exception to the warrant requirement applied only to
situations where "a property owner... voluntarily acquiesced directly to
law enforcement officers, in their presence, to a warrantless search."'1 50 In
Chapman v. United States,15 1 the Supreme Court ruled that a landlord
cannot consent to a search of his tenant's home because holding otherwise
"'would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave [tenants']
homes secure only in the discretion of [landlords]. ' "l 52 In Stoner v.
California,153 the Supreme Court similarly held that a hotel clerk could not
consent to the search of one of his guest's rooms. 154 Importantly, the Court
stated that "it was the petitioner's constitutional right which was at stake...
and not the night clerk's nor the hotel's. It was a right, therefore, which
only the petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or through
an agent."' 55 Requiring that consent come directly from the defendant or
from an agent appeared to severely limit, or even essentially abolish, third56
party consent as an exception to the warrant requirement. 1
However, several rulings by the Supreme Court gradually expanded the
157
doctrine to include consent obtained from nonagent third parties.
Beginning with Frazierv. Cupp, 158 the Court identified the justification for
third-party consent that would pave the way for the Randolph holding and
the current split between the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits:
individuals who share their property or possessions with another person
"assume[] the risk" that this individual will allow police, or anyone else, to
enter and seize incriminating evidence.1 59 In Frazier,the defendant, who
shared a room with his cousin, was arrested for murder. 160 Martin Frazier's
cousin gave police permission to search a duffel bag that he shared with
Frazier and that contained evidence that was used to convict Frazier of

150. Jason M. Ferguson, Randolph v. Georgia:

The Beginning of a New Era in Third-

Party Consent Cases, 31 NOVA L. REV. 605, 609 (2007).
151. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
152. Id. at 617 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (alterations in
original)).
153. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
154. Id. at 487-88.
155. Id. at 489; see also supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text (discussing waiver
principles).
156. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT 145 (4th ed. 2004) (arguing that "'the Stoner ruling... could have sounded the
death knell for almost all third party consent searches"' (quoting Judith E. Diamond,
Relevance of the Absent Party's Whereabouts in Third Party Consent Searches, 53 B.U. L

REV. 1087, 1104 (1973))).
157. See Ferguson, supra note 150, at 609-17 (summarizing development of third-party
consent law); Godfrey & Levine, supra note 95, at 735-41 (same); Nathan A. Wood,
Georgia v. Randolph: What to Do With a Yes from One but Not from Two?, 58 MERCER L.

REV. 1429, 1432-36 (2007) (same).
158. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
159. Id. at 740.
160. State v. Frazier, 418 P.2d 841, 842 (Or. 1966).
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murder. 16 1 The Supreme Court, in determining that the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, held that Frazier, "in allowing [his cousin]
to use the bag and in leaving it in his house, must be taken to have assumed
the risk that [his cousin] would allow someone else to look inside."' 162 It
remained to be seen, however, whether the Court would apply this same
logic to searches of a home that the owner or tenant has chosen to share
with another individual. The Supreme Court initially delved into 164
this area
163
in two cases: UnitedStates v. Matlock and Illinois v. Rodriguez.
1. United States v. Matlock
In Matlock, the Supreme Court confronted the question of "whether...
the voluntary consent of a third party to search the living quarters of the
respondent was legally sufficient to render the seized materials admissible
in evidence at the respondent's criminal trial," where the third party was
respondent's co-tenant. 1 65 William Matlock was arrested in the front yard
of his home and placed in a police car; 166 at no time did the police request
his consent to search the house, although they were fully aware that he lived
there. 167 Instead, the officers left Matlock confined in the police car and
obtained consent to search the premises from Gayle Graff, 168 who also lived
at the house and shared a bedroom with Matlock, although they were not
married. 169 The Court initially found that "the consent of one who
possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the
absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared."' 170 The
Court went on to elaborate on the idea of "[c]ommon authority," stating that
it is "not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in
the property," instead it
rests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize
that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his
own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit the common area to be searched.171
The Court thus confirmed that the basis for third-party consent searches is
not agency relationships or property interests, and it does not depend in any
way on the third party somehow waiving the defendant's rights; it is instead

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 842-43.
Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740.
See infra Part I.C. 1.
See infra Part I.C.2.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974).
Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 166 (majority opinion).
Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 175-76 (majority opinion).
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171 n.7.
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a personal, independent right to consent that a co-tenant possesses. 172
Further, the Court asserted that by choosing to share their home, defendants
assume the risk that their co-occupants will exercise this right. 173 The basis
for valid third-party consent therefore originates in the defendant's own
actions: his choice to cohabitate. 174 The decision also planted the seeds for
the Randolph dispute by limiting the power of a third party to situations
75
where the nonconsenting co-occupant is absent. 1
The Matlock Court did not reach the question of whether "a warrantless
entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the
police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common
authority over the premises, but who in fact does not do so."176 The Court
confronted that issue in the case discussed below, Illinois v. Rodriguez.
2. Illinois v. Rodriguez
In Illinois v. Rodriguez the Court found that a third party need not have
actual authority over the property to validly consent to a search. 177 In
Rodriguez, the police gained access to Edward Rodriguez's apartment
through Gail
Fischer, who had a key and referred to the apartment as
' 17 8
"'our[s].'

At the time the police entered the apartment, with Fischer's

permission, Rodriguez was asleep in the bedroom. 179 The trial court found,
and the Supreme Court agreed, that Fischer did not have common authority
over the apartment and that in fact she was merely an "infrequent
visitor." 180 Matlock had suggested that the Court would insist that "consent

can only arise from the conduct of a person whose privacy right is actually
at stake."' 181 This is because Matlock was premised on the theories of
common authority and assumption of risk, which require that there be a
third party with actual authority over the home.182
Nonetheless, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Rodriguez majority,
rejected the contention that "permitting a reasonable belief of common
172. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 156, at 149 (summarizing the "two bases for the 'common
authority' rule"); Ferguson, supra note 150, at 612 ("[T]he Court defined 'common
authority' to consent based upon two factors: first, based upon the inherent right of the cooccupant granting the consent to do so; and second, the actions or inactions of the defendant
against whom evidence is being used in 'assuming the risk' that his/her co-occupant will
grant consent.").
173. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
174. See Davies, supra note 105, at 33 (noting that "[t]his assumption of risk language
indicates the Court's view that a release of a person's right under the Fourth Amendment can
be located only in an aspect of that person's own conduct, such as the person's acceptance of
another person as a co-inhabitant").
175. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.
176. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990).
177. Id. at 183.
178. Id. at 179.
179. Id.at 180.
180. Id. at 180-83.
181. See Davies, supra note 105, at 34.
182. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1974).
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authority to validate an entry would cause a defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights to be 'vicariously waived" 1 83 and instead held that, "in order to
satisfy the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is
generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly
be made by agents of the government... is not that they always be correct,
but that they always be reasonable."' 84 The Court thus found that the
Fourth Amendment does not require that police officers determine with
absolute certainty whether a third party has actual authority to consent to a
search, but instead that they form an objective belief, based on the
"surrounding circumstances," that the "consenting party had authority over
the premises."' 85 In other words, the Court recognized that a third party
with apparent, rather than actual, authority may grant consent to search a
186
property.
The majority's analysis represents a significant change in focus: from
the individual whose privacy interest is at risk to an objective
reasonableness test that considers the conduct of the police officers
involved in making the warrantless intrusion. 187 In Stoner v. California,the
Court noted that "[i]t is important to bear in mind that it was the petitioner's
constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the [third party's]. It
was a right, therefore, which only the petitioner could waive." 188 Matlock
remained true to this fundamental idea that the focus in consent disputes
must be on the defendant and the individual granting consent-the reason
why Gayle Graff was able to consent was because she had "[c]ommon
authority" over the premises and Matlock himself had "assumed the risk"
that she would allow others access to the premises. 189 Matlock did not
discuss the reasonableness of the police officer's actions; the analysis
focused entirely on Matlock's and Graffts actions.
Justice Scalia instead approached the problem from the perspective of the
police, and found that officers, when applying for a search warrant, need
not be "factually correct in [their] assessment [of] what a search will
produce," and that a warrant itself need not be entirely free from error to
remain effective. 190 He therefore concluded that the determination of the
"common authority" required by Matlock is, as with the determination of
probable cause, a "factual question" that must only be answered reasonably,
rather than correctly. 19 1 Professor Mary Coombs has argued that, even if
183. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183.
184. Id. at 185-86.
185. Id. at 188; see also Ferguson, supra note 150, at 614 ("[A]II that is required in
justifying a warrantless search based upon third-party consent is that the police officers make
reasonable conclusions from the facts.").
186. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 187-88.
187. See Davies, supra note 105, at 36 (the majority asserts that "consent is to be assessed
from the ex ante viewpoint of the police officer").
188. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).
189. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7, 175-77 (1974).
190. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 184.
191. See id. at 179, 186. But see Davies, supra note 105, at 73-97 (expressing the
opposing view). Thomas Davies explains that "[t]he question the police were required to
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one were to accept Justice Scalia's rule that police officers must only act
reasonably, the risk of error should fall on the police, because, if they truly
behave reasonably (i.e., "inquire sufficiently into the basis of the third
party's authority"), then cases of apparent authority should only arise when
the third party lies. 192 In these cases, Professor Coombs suggests that,
because "the police are trained to spot a lie," their failure to do so should
19 3
not be allowed to benefit the government's case.
As the Rodriguez dissent pointed out, Justice Scalia's focus on
"reasonableness" came at the expense of much of the rationale for
Matlock.194 The majority agreed that the lower court's "determination of
no common authority over the apartment was obviously correct," but did
not follow this conclusion to its seemingly logical next step: that Rodriguez
therefore had not assumed the risk that his home would be shared with the
195
police or anyone else.
In Rodriguez, as with Matlock, the Court was not faced with disputed
consent, where two occupants disagree over whether the police should be
allowed to enter. In fact, the Court did not confront this particular issue
until Georgia v. Randolph, sixteen years later. It remained to be seen
whether the Court would look to the reasonableness of the police officers'
conduct when confronted with this situation, or instead focus on the
assumption of risk inherent in shared living arrangements.
Scott
Randolph's arrest in 2001 provided the Court with an opportunity to
address this issue in the case discussed below.
3. Georgia v. Randolph
Although it would be reasonable to assume that William Matlock, given
the opportunity, would have objected to the search of his home, his silence
on the topic allowed the Supreme Court to avoid an explicit holding on how

answer in assessing Fischer's authority to consent did not consist only of a 'factual
determination' about where she resided." Id. at 76. Davies argues that there is evidence that
the police were ignorant of the Matlock standard and that therefore "the police
misassessment of Fischer's authority to consent was [not solely] factual in nature" and that
there is "no doctrinal basis ... for excusing police ignorance of legal standards." Id. at 76.
Davies also suggests that even if the error was factual in nature, the Supreme Court has only
excused such errors when they "involved factual aspects of the assessment of probable
cause." Id. at 80.
192. Coombs, supra note 58, at 1662.
193. Id.
194. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 194 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Even if the officers
reasonably believed that Fischer had authority to consent, she did not, and Rodriguez's
expectation of privacy was therefore undiminished."); see also Godfrey & Levine, supra
note 95, at 738 ("[Alpparent authority permits the 'trampling [of] the rights of a person who
has not.., relinquished any of his privacy expectation."' (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at
198 (Marshall, J., dissenting))).

195. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 182; see also Coombs, supra note 58, at 1662
(suggesting that in these situations "there is no genuine third-party autonomy to balance
against the invasion of the defendant's private (and actually unshared) place").
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his objection would have affected Gayle Graffts consent. 196 The Court
granted a writ of certiorari in Randolph in order to resolve a split of
authority on this issue. 197 All courts of appeals to consider the issue had
"concluded that consent remains effective in the face of an express
objection," and a majority of state courts agreed. 198 In holding that "a
physically present co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry prevails"
over the consent of a present fellow occupant, 199 the Supreme Court
disagreed with what appeared to be a growing consensus.
a. The Importance of Social Expectations
In developing the basis for its holding, the majority focused heavily on
the "great significance [of] widely shared social expectations. '20 0 A large
part of the holding rests on the contention that
it is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would
have no confidence that one occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good
reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, "stay out."

Without some very good
reason, no sensible person would go inside
1
under those conditions. 20
The Court found that, because co-occupants exercise equal authority over
the premises, "the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no
recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and
objecting co-tenant. '202 Therefore, a police officer must treat the situation
as if he had received no consent at all, because in normal social situations
this type of disagreement would be resolved "through voluntary
203
accommodation," rather than through forced resolution.
This was not the first time the Court had used "social customs and
norms" in order to determine the reasonableness of police entry and
search. 20 4 In Katz v. United States, 20 5 Justice John M. Harlan suggested

that, in order for a defendant to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, he must show that he had a subjective expectation of privacy,
and also "that the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize
196. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974) ("Although the officers were

aware at the time of the arrest that respondent lived in the house, they did not ask him which
room he occupied or whether he would consent to a search.").
197. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006).

198. Id. at 1520 n.1 (citing United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 533-36 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Hendrix,
595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684,
687-88 (6th Cir. 1977)).
199. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1519.
200. Id. at 1521.
201. Id. at 1522-23.
202. Id. at 1523.
203. Id.
204. Orin S. Kerr, FourModels of Fourth Amendment Protection,60 STAN. L. REv. 503,
510 (2007).
205. See supra Part I.A.2.
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as 'reasonable.' 20 6 Later, in Rakas v. Illinois,20 7 the Court again suggested

that legitimate expectations of privacy could be determined by looking to
"understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. '20 8 The
Court looked more explicitly to social customs in Minnesota v. Olson,209 in
which the police searched an apartment where Robert Olson was staying as
a guest. 2 10 The Court first recognized that "[s]taying overnight in another's
home is a longstanding social custom," 2 11 and then went on to determine
that "it is unlikely that [a host] will admit someone who wants to see or
meet with the guest over the objection of the guest. '2 12 On this basis, the
Court found that Olson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
2 13
friend's home.
The primary criticism of Justice David H. Souter's "social expectations"
analysis in Randolph is that it "is entirely subjective and probably
impossible to confirm." 2 14 The Randolph majority provided no citation to
any authority upon which it based its conclusion that a visitor would choose
not to enter when faced with conflicting responses from occupants, and in
fact there is some evidence that courts have a tendency to get this type of
Professors Christopher Slobogin and Joseph
analysis wrong. 2 15
Schumacher conducted an empirical analysis aimed at determining how
people react to police investigations; 2 16 their results suggest that "some of
the Court's decisions regarding the threshold of the Fourth Amendment and
the warrant and probable cause requirement do not reflect societal
understandings." 2 17 In Randolph, the Court's analysis focused on how
individuals react when visitors-not police-attempt to enter a home, but
the results of Slobogin and Schumacher's study indicate that the Court may
206. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also
Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 106 (noting that, "[n]ot long after Katz, the full Court adopted
Justice Harlan's formulation" and that "Fourth Amendment law has sought to protect
'reasonable expectations of privacy' ever since" (citations omitted)).

207. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
208. Id. at 144 n.12.
209. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
210. Id. at 94.
211. Id. at98.
212. Id. at99.
213. See id. at 100. But see Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1998) (narrowing
the Olson holding by suggesting that, while society recognizes an overnight guest's
expectation of privacy, the same protection does not extend to "one who is merely present
with the consent of the householder").
214. Lesley McCall, Georgia v. Randolph: Whose Castle Is It, Anyway?, 41 U. RICH. L.

REv. 589, 600 (2007). Lesley McCall argues that, instead of focusing on the "weak 'social
expectation' theory," Justice David Souter should have clearly asserted that "the Fourth
Amendment's protection of privacy in one's home should be paramount to police
expediency." Id. at 601-02.
215. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, ReasonableExpectations of Privacy
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permittedby Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993).
216. Id. at 733 ("[W]e were interested in how society perceives the 'intrusiveness' of
government investigative methods.").
217. Id. at 732.

2009]

THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES

3393

not be proficient in determining societal expectations in the Fourth
Amendment context.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, in his dissent, rejected the "fundamental
predicate to the majority's analysis," arguing that "[t]he .majority's
assumption about voluntary accommodation simply leads to the common
stalemate of two gentlemen insisting that the other enter ... first. ' 2 18 Chief
Justice Roberts suggested that there are a "wide variety of differing social
situations," and that "slight variations in the fact pattern yield vastly
different expectations about whether the invitee might be expected to enter
or to go away." 2 19 Justice Antonin Scalia had previously commented on the
Court's assumptions about societal expectations. 220 Calling the Court's
social expectations test "self-indulgent," Justice Scalia noted that the
"'actual (subjective) expectation[s] of privacy' 'that society is prepared to
recognize as "reasonable,"' bear an uncanny resemblance to those
'22
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable." '
In Randolph, Chief Justice Roberts also fundamentally disagreed with the
majority's contention that "social expectations" should be considered in the
context of a consent search, arguing that "the social expectations concept
has not been applied to all questions arising under the Fourth Amendment,
least of all issues of consent. '222 Roberts essentially argued that the
majority applied a "social expectations" standard when the Court's
precedent suggested that the relevant issue was whether the individual had a
"'legitimate expectation of privacy."' 2 23 The social expectations test,
according to Roberts, should only be used to "determine when a search has
occurred and whether a particular person has standing to object to a
search. ' 224 Roberts contended that the Court's earlier decisions in Matlock
and Rodriguez clearly held that, "[i]f an individual shares information,
papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person
will in turn share access to that information or those papers or places with
the government. ' 225 In other words, Randolph's objection was irrelevant in
the face of his wife's consent; once he agreed to share authority over the
premises, he assumed the risk that that she would allow others to enterincluding the police: "The Constitution ... protects.., privacy, and once

218. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1532 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
219. Id.; see also Godfrey & Levine, supra note 95, at 747 (noting the "uncertainty
inherent in the social expectations test"); Wood, supra note 157, at 1446 ("[T]his holding is
unstable because it is based on social expectations that are unique to each factual

scenario.... Since these social expectations change so easily in different circumstances, the
holding lends little certainty to police-work or notice to citizens.").

220. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
221. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967)).
222. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1533 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)).
224. Id. at 1538.
225. Id. at 1531. But see McCall, supra note 214, at 607 ("Matlock is only 'clear' if one
misconstrues it to apply to present defendants as well as absent defendants at whom the
ruling was originally aimed, as the Chief Justice did here.").
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privacy has been shared, the shared.., places remain private only at the
'226
discretion of the confidant.
Professor Jed Rubenfeld also criticizes the Court's use of a social
expectations analysis in Fourth Amendment cases. 227 Rubenfeld argues
that "the invocation of widely shared social expectations," to the Randolph
fact pattern is only feasible if we assume that the unspecified caller at the
door in Justice Souter's hypothetical is in fact "a quite specific kind of
visitor": a stranger. 228 It is necessary to assume the visitor is a stranger
because otherwise the "pertinent social expectations will almost always turn
on the specific identity of the caller, including his relationship to and
knowledge of the individual claiming a privacy violation." 229 In all
likelihood, "the consenting resident's boyfriend" would be expected to
enter, despite another resident objecting, as would family members of the
consenting individual. 230 Of course, an individual with a lesser connection
to the consenting individual is probably less likely to ignore the objecting
resident. The visitor certainly cannot be a police officer, because he or she
would be trained to ignore the potential dangers that might prevent an
ordinary citizen from entering. 23 1 However, "if we picture a perfect
stranger at the door in Randolph, the Court's reasoning begins to sound
plausible." 232 It would be awkward for such a stranger to enter despite
conflicting responses from the residents, and therefore he or she would
probably choose to stay out.
Rubenfeld argues that the Supreme Court has been applying this
"stranger principle" broadly across Fourth Amendment case law. 2 33
Essentially, "[a]ccording to the [s]tranger [p]rinciple, to the extent we have
opened something otherwise private to a perfect stranger, the police may
intrude into it as well."' 234 Rubenfeld suggests that under this stranger
principle Randolph was correctly decided because the average stranger
226. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1533 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
227. See Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 107-09.
228. Id. at 108-09.
229. Id. at 108.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 110.
232. Id. at 109.
233. Id. at 110-12. Jed Rubenfeld argues that the "stranger principle" explains the plainview doctrine, "which allows a patrolman to look anywhere, even inside a home, provided
that he does no more than what a stranger could have done." Id. at 110-11; see also Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). According to
Rubenfeld, in United States v. Miller, "the Supreme Court upheld the government's
acquisition of financial data from a bank because that data had been shared with strangers."
Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 111. Likewise, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court allowed the
government to monitor phone numbers the defendant had dialed because he had "voluntarily
conveyed" and "exposed" the information to the telephone company. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744
(internal quotation marks omitted). Rubenfeld also notes that the stranger principle
"support[s] the executive branch's recent efforts to force Google and other
telecommunications service providers to turn over individuals' search histories and calling
data." Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 112.
234. Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 110.
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would not enter, and therefore Randolph had not exposed his home to a
stranger and thus "retained a legitimate expectation of privacy. '235
However, Rubenfeld argues that the "widely shared social expectations"
framework for analyzing and deciding Fourth Amendment cases, which
leads to the stranger principle, is ultimately "untenable. '236 Following the
principle to its logical conclusion leads to a situation whereby "a person
who exposes information to third parties has surrendered his privacy in that
information altogether, rendering it subject to police acquisition with or
without the third party's assistance. '23 7 This path would result in the
overruling of Katz, the very case that provided that the Fourth Amendment
protects reasonable expectations of privacy. 238 The reasonable expectations
of privacy methodology is particularly dangerous in our "increasingly
digitized, networked world with ever-expanding privacy-invading
technologies," where huge swathes of information are exposed to third
parties, and thus unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. 239 Ultimately,
Rubenfeld argues for "cut[ting] anchor with the expectations-of-privacy
apparatus," because it neglects to provide the protection intended by the
240
Framers.
Instead, Rubenfeld suggests that under his "test of generalizability" 24 1
Randolph was incorrectly decided. 242 Under his analysis, the controlling
issue in the case is not whether the police may enter a home when faced
with disputed consent, but instead whether the police may enter when one
occupant calls for their help and asks them to enter. 243 The question, under
the test of generalizability, is "whether the power asserted by the police in
Randolph, if generalized, posed a threat to the conditions, existence, or
health of personal life.''244 When viewed from the perspective of the person

who requested the police presence, rather than from the perspective of the
person who objected to their entry, it becomes apparent that there was no
threat to the security protected by the Fourth Amendment, even if
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 112.
Id. at 109, 113-15.
Id. at 114.
See id. Katz v. United States held that "[o]ne who occupies [a phone booth], shuts

the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." 389
U.S. 347, 352 (1967). However, according to Rubenfeld's stranger principle, Charles Katz
shared his conversation with a third party, and therefore lost his privacy interest in it: "Thus
modem Fourth Amendment 'expectations of privacy' analysis cannot even sustain its
inaugural case." Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 115.
239. See Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 115.
240. Id. Rubenfeld offers a new paradigm for approaching Fourth Amendment issues,
focusing on security rather than privacy. For a further discussion, see supra notes 82-91 and
accompanying text.
241. Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 131-38; see also supra notes 92-94 and accompanying
text.
242. Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 108.
243. See id. at 136 (noting that "[tihe fact that the police in Randolph were responding to
a voluntary call made by one of the residents deserves emphasis").

244. Id.
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Randolph's "reasonable expectations of privacy . . . may have been
defeated. '245 The police were acting entirely in response to a request by a
resident of the home they entered-the circumstances of the search and
seizure were not instigated by the police. 24 6 The Court, by focusing its
analysis on when the disputed consent occurred, rather than when Janet
Randolph initially contacted the police, lost sight of the critical fact that
Mrs. Randolph had not merely consented to their request to enter, she was
in fact the entire impetus for their presence.
b. The Effect on Third-PartyConsent Precedent
The Randolph Court acknowledged that in order to avoid undercutting
Matlock and Rodriguez it was "drawing a fine line" 247 between Randolph
and those precedents. The distinction the Court made between the cases
was to focus on whether or not the dissenting occupant was present and
objecting at the time that the consenting occupants granted permission to
enter: "if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at
the door and objects, the co-tenant's permission does not suffice for a
reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to
'24 8
take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out."
It has been argued that the true distinction between the cases is not so
much physical presence and objection, but instead whether the police must
admit awareness of an objection. 2 49 It strains credulity to believe that the
police were unaware that Matlock and Rodriguez would have preferred
them not to enter their homes. Thus, the police in Matlock and Rodriguez
essentially remained willfully blind to what was obvious. The danger in
advocating this distinction is that it implicitly encourages police to avoid
finding out what they most likely already know, perhaps leading to "an
unspoken 'Don't Ask So the Suspect Won't Tell' training policy in order to
2 50
direct officers to the safe side of the Court's fine line."
Further, by refusing to tamper with the holdings in Matlock and
Rodriguez, the Randolph Court may have rendered a "reasonable
conclusion . . . . toothless." 25 1 The decision forces an individual to
245. Id. at 137.
246. Id. at 136 (stressing that "we deal here with a rupture in personal life instigated by an
inhabitant of personal life, not by the police or by a state actor").
247. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1527 (2006).
248. Id.
249. See George M. Dery III & Michael J. Hernandez, Blissful Ignorance? The Supreme
Court's Signal to Police in Georgia v. Randolph to Avoid Seeking Consent to Searchfrom
All Occupants of a Home, 40 CONN. L. REV. 53, 79 (2007) ("The clear difference, of course,
is that Randolph actually explicitly refused the government intrusion while these other

defendants did not. Is there any real question, however, that, given notice and opportunity,
they too would have rejected the government intrusion? The practical difference therefore
comes down to knowledge-Scott Randolph was lucky enough to have learned in time that
his privacy was being threatened so he could assert his rights.").

250. Id. at 82.
251. Madeline E. McNeeley, Validity of Consent to Warrantless Search of Residence
When Co-occupant Expressly Objects, 74 TENN. L. REV. 259, 271 (2007) (arguing that,

2009]

THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES

3397

"literally stand in the doorway and forbid the officers to enter" in order to
"safeguard her constitutional rights." 252 This requirement appears to
253
protect, as Chief Justice Roberts argues, good luck rather than privacy.
In addition, notwithstanding the Court's claims, the Randolph opinion is
not wholly consistent with Rodriguez.254 In Rodriguez, Justice Scalia
expanded the exception to the warrant requirement in third-party consent
searches by allowing that police need not be correct in their determination
that an individual has authority to consent to a search, they need only be
reasonable. 255 Applying this rationale to Randolph, it is easy to conclude
that the officers' "conduct was entirely reasonable under an objective
standard. '256 Professor Jason Ferguson argues that "prior to Randolph, the
Court seemed consistently reluctant to engage in after-the-fact, Monday
morning quarterbacking of decisions by police," whereas now, courts, when
faced with a disputed consent situation, must apply a bright-line rule that
'257
"does not acknowledge the reasonableness of the officer's conduct.
c. "The CircumstancesHere at Issue"
In presenting the holding of the Randolph Court, Justice Souter explicitly
limited it to "the circumstances here at issue." 258 The Court suggested that,
"if the objecting tenant cannot be incapacitated from destroying easily
disposable evidence during the time required to get a warrant," officers may
be justified in entering despite the occupant's objection. 2 59 The narrowness
of the holding was confirmed by Justice Stephen G. Breyer's concurrence,
in which he stated that "were the circumstances to change significantly, so
should the result. The Court's opinion does not apply where the objector is
not present and object[ing]. ' '260 The "circumstances" to which Justice
Breyer referred were that (1) "[t]he objecting party was present and made
his objection known clearly and directly to the officers seeking to enter the
house"; (2) "[t]he officers did not justify their search on grounds of possible
evidence destruction"; and (3) "the officers might easily have secured the
premises and sought a warrant permitting them to enter." 26 1 The Court's
desire to limit its holding, in combination with the pains they went to ensure
that the Matlock and Rodriguez decisions remained on the books, sowed the
seeds for the current conflict over how to handle situations that differ from

"once an individual has invoked the Fourth Amendment, only certain extreme circumstances
may override that right").
252. Id.
253. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
254. Ferguson, supra note 150, at 638.
255. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990).
256. Ferguson, supra note 150, at 638.
257. Id.
258. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
259. Id. at 1524 n.6.
260. Id. at 1530 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
261. Id.
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the circumstances described by Justice Breyer. 262 In fact, some argued that
the case would soon be essentially irrelevant to Fourth Amendment law
because its narrowness renders it inapplicable to even marginally different
circumstances.

263

d. Police Removal
The Randolph Court seemed to envision the conflict under discussion
when it suggested that police cannot "remove[] the potentially objecting
264
tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection."
This caveat raises the issue of how courts will determine the intent of
officers in removing tenants from the scene. 265 Professor George Dery and
Deputy District Attorney Michael Hernandez argue that courts will be
unable to comply with this aspect of the decision without violating the rule
asserted in Whren v. United States.2 66 The Whren Court "explicitly
repudiated" the idea that a court should "attempt to divine the underlying
motivation" for an officer's conduct. 26 7 Further, the Supreme Court has
"repeatedly held and asserted" that an officer's motive does not invalidate
objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment. 268 Courts
determining why police removed an occupant from the scene before
obtaining consent from another must somehow do so without attempting to
ascertain the officers' subjective intent, which would appear to be an
impossible task.
In sum, when faced with third-party consent search issues, courts must
not only contend with the fundamental issues of whether the Fourth
Amendment is dedicated to the protection of property, privacy, security, or
some combination thereof, they must also consider whether the controlling
issue is the defendant's assumption of the risk as outlined in Matlock,269 or
the reasonableness of the police officers' actions, as suggested by
Rodriguez.2 70 Further, post-Randolph, courts are now asked to conclusively
262. For further discussion of Justice Stephen Breyer's concurrence, and an argument that
this Justice might change his position in future cases because of his disapproval of a "brightline" rather than a "fact-intensive" approach, see Ferguson, supra note 150, at 638-43.
263. See Godfrey & Levine, supra note 95, at 744-45 ("[D]ifficulty may arise when the
time comes to apply [Randolph] to future third party consent cases."); David A. Moran, The
End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth
Amendment, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 283, 285 ("[A] holding so narrow as to make the case
of almost no precedential value."); Wood, supra note 157, at 1445 ("[Slince this holding
seems to render a third-party consent-based search unreasonable only when the defendant is
physically present and objecting, the cases that will be affected will be relatively few.").
264. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.
265. See Godfrey & Levine, supra note 95, at 748 (questioning how courts will determine
whether an individual was removed "for the purpose of keeping him quiet").
266. 517 U.S. 806 (1996); Dery & Hernandez, supra note 249, at 82-83.
267. Dery & Hemandez, supra note 249, at 82.
268. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812.
269. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974); see also supra notes
170-74 and accompanying text.
270. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990); see also supra notes 183-86
and accompanying text.

2009]

THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES

3399

determine society's "widely shared social expectations." '27 1 Part II
examines how courts are applying Randolph to cases with similar facts.
I.

APPLYING RANDOLPH: THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT

As outlined in Part I, courts addressing Fourth Amendment claims must
consider a huge variety of issues and principles before concluding a
The Supreme Court's Fourth
particular search is constitutional.
Amendment third-party consent search jurisprudence has thus far
culminated in Randolph. Part II presents an overview of three recently
273
decided cases, United States v. Murphy,2 72 United States v. Hudspeth,
and United States v. Henderson,274 which feature U.S. courts of appeals
coming to significantly different conclusions regarding Randolph's intent
and scope. In each case, the defendant expressly refused to consent to a
search of his property, but the police were nevertheless able to effect a
search by arresting the defendant and obtaining consent from another
individual.
In the wake of Matlock, courts and commentators struggled with how to
apply its holding to situations in which "police arrest a suspect, ask for but
fail to obtain his consent to search his premises, and then go to those
premises and obtain consent from another occupant. ' '275 The consensus
among commentators 276 was that "the prior refusal of the absent occupant
to give consent would not present a bar to the police seeking consent from a
co-occupant. '27 7 Unless the objecting individual possessed a greater
interest in the property to be searched, the personal, nonderivative right to
consent to a search continues to exist regardless of another tenant's
278
objection.
However, courts were not entirely in agreement with this interpretation.
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, held that, "if the
Fourth Amendment means anything, it means that the police may not
undertake a warrantless search of [the] defendant's property after he has
expressly denied his consent to such a search. ' 279 The court seemed to find
that the simple fact that the defendant objected should control the police's
actions, so as to avoid a situation where "[c]onstitutional rights [are]
several persons successively until the
defeated by the expedient of soliciting
'280
sought-after consent is obtained.

271. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1531 (2006); see also supra notes 200-46 and

accompanying text.
272. See infra Part II.A.
273. See infra Part II.B.
274. See infra Part II.C.
275. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 156, at 155.
276. Id. at 156 n.45.
277. Id. at 156.
278. Id.
279. People v. Mortimer, 361 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (App. Div. 1974).

280. Id.
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The Randolph holding provided fuel to proponents of both sides of this
argument, and certainly did not conclusively resolve the issue. Professor
Tracey Maclin hypothesizes that "Randolph's protection will probably
extend only to the few individuals lucky enough to be present when the
police arrive at their homes," and suggested that the police would most
likely "remove or arrest a suspect before seeking the co-occupant's
consent. ' 281 Professor Orin Kerr, writing before Randolph was decided,
suggested that the rule eventually adopted by the Court would be difficult
"to administer for practical reasons" because it raises as many questions as
it answers, including whether the police could "wait until the nonconsenting
party leaves, and then ask again. '282 Stephanie Godfrey and Professor Kay
Levine argue that "the majority's failure to be clear on subjects like removal
. . . promises to generate much future litigation. '283 As the cases below
suggest, Godfrey and Levine are correct.
A. The Ninth Circuit: United States v. Murphy
On August 4, 2004, police officers knocked on the door of Stephen
Wayne Murphy's storage unit. 284 Prior investigation had led the police to
believe that the storage facility was being used to manufacture
methamphetamine, and when Murphy opened the door to his unit he was
holding a metal pipe. 285 The officer was able to see a methamphetamine
lab in the unit, which led him to place Murphy under arrest. 286 Murphy
refused to consent to a search of the unit and was thereafter taken to jail.2 87
The arresting officer then left to begin the process of obtaining a search
288
warrant.
Murphy's storage unit was actually rented to Dennis Roper, who arrived
at the storage facility later that afternoon and was promptly arrested based
on outstanding warrants. 289 He told the police that he had given Murphy
permission to live in the storage unit and also consented to a search. 290 The
29 1
police seized the methamphetamine lab.
At trial in 2005, before Randolph was decided, Murphy moved to
suppress the seized evidence on the grounds that "Roper's consent [could
not] trump his objection to the search. ' 292 In denying Murphy's motion, the
281. Maclin, supra note 103, at 75-76.

282. Posting

of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy,

http://volokh.com/posts/

1131323472.shtml (Nov. 6, 2005, 18:31 EST).
283. Godfrey & Levine, supra note 95, at 749.
284. United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008).

285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1119-20.
288. Id. at 1120.

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. United States v. Murphy, No. 04-30057-AA, 2005 WL 2416828, at *4 (D. Or. Sept.

30, 2005).

2009]

THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES

3401

district court relied on United States v. Morning,293 a Ninth Circuit case that
held that "consent to search given by a co-occupant is valid as against the
defendant when both are on the scene but the defendant has refused to
that the district
consent. '294 In the wake of Randolph, Murphy requested
29 5
court reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.
On appeal, the government initially made clear that Dennis Roper's
consent was voluntary. 296 Although acknowledging that Roper was in
custody at the time of his consent, the government listed several factors
suggesting that the consent was voluntary, such as the fact that the arresting
officers read Roper his Miranda warnings, the officers' weapons remained
holstered, and Roper subsequently testified that his consent was
voluntary. 297 Murphy did not dispute that Roper's consent was voluntary,
and the Ninth Circuit did not discuss the issue.
Turning to Randolph, the government focused on attempting to
distinguish Murphy's circumstances from those of Randolph. 298 First, the
disputed consent at issue in Randolph was over a home, whereas Murphy
was seeking to protect only a storage unit, which the government argued
entailed a lower expectation of privacy. 299 Second, unlike in Randolph,
Murphy and Roper were not simultaneously present-Murphy was no
longer on the scene when Roper provided consent. 300 The court, however,
found these distinctions to be "legally meaning[less]" and saw "no
reason ...why Murphy's arrest should vitiate the objection he had already
registered to the search. '30 1 The court did not discuss Randolph's reliance
on social expectations, nor did it address the issue of the parties' legitimate
expectations of privacy. Instead, the court based its decision primarily on
Randolph's suggestion that a third party's consent to a search would be held
invalid if there was evidence that the police removed one of the tenants
from the scene to ensure that he had no opportunity to object. 30 2 The court
reasoned that, "[i]f the police cannot prevent a co-tenant from objecting to a
search through arrest, surely they cannot arrest a co-tenant and then seek to
ignore an objection he has already made." 30 3 In fact, in dicta, the court
293. 64 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 1995).
294. Id. at 536. In United States v. Morning, the Court anticipated the argument that
Chief Justice John Roberts would later assert in his Georgia v. Randolph dissent:

[T]he primary factor is the defendant's reasonable expectations under the
circumstances.

Those expectations must include the risk that a co-occupant will

allow someone to enter, even if the defendant does not approve of the entry .... A
defendant cannot expect sole exclusionary authority unless he lives alone, or at
least has a special and private space within the joint residence.
Id.
295. Murphy, 516 F.3d at 1120.
296. Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee at 13-15, Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (No. 06-3-582).
297. Id. at 14-15.

298. Id. at 17-19.
299. Id. at 17.
300. Id. at 18-19.
301. Murphy, 516 F.3dat 1122, 1124.
302. Id. at 1124.
303. Id. at 1124-25.
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suggested that whether the objecting tenant left the scene voluntarily or in
the custody of the police would not be relevant: "Once a co-tenant has
registered his objection, his refusal to grant consent remains effective
barring some objective manifestation that he has changed his position and
no longer objects." 30 4 The court placed no time limit on the objection,
which presumably would last indefinitely in the absence of a clear showing
of consent.
B. The Eighth Circuit: United States v. Hudspeth
On July 25, 2002, police obtained a search warrant for Roy Hudspeth's
company, Handi-Rak Services, Inc. 30 5 The officers were looking for
evidence of sales of pseudoephedrine-based cold tablets. 30 6 The search
30 7
included Hudspeth's computer and some CDs that were on his desk.
While browsing the files on the discs, the officers discovered child
pornography. 30 8 The officers suspected that they might find additional
child pornography on Hudspeth's home computer and therefore asked for
his permission to seize it. 30 9 Hudspeth refused and was arrested and
3 10
transported to jail.
The officers then proceeded to Hudspeth's home, where they informed
his wife that Hudspeth had been arrested and asked for her consent to seize
the computers in the home. 3 11 Initially, Mrs. Hudspeth refused, but she
changed her mind after police explained that they would leave an armed
officer in the house while they applied for a search warrant. 3 12 With Mrs.
Hudspeth's consent, the officers seized a home computer and additional
313
CDs, which contained child pornography.
At trial, Hudspeth moved to suppress the warrantless search of his home
computer. 3 14 The district court denied the motion, and Hudspeth entered a
conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion
to suppress. 315 On appeal, Hudspeth argued both that the consent obtained
from Mrs. Hudspeth was coerced 3 16 and that Randolph required evidence
obtained from the search and seizure of the home computer to be
suppressed. 3 17 The appeal was initially heard by an Eighth Circuit panel
that first briefly addressed the issue of Georgia Hudspeth's voluntary
304. Id. at 1125.
305. United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006), rev'd in part, affid in
part en banc, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 925.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

314. Id. at 926.
315. Id.

316. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 18, at 5.
317. Letter Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 16, at 4-5.
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consent, concluding that "there was nothing coercive about the officers'
conduct. ' 3 18 The court acknowledged that the police arrived at night, while
Mrs. Hudspeth was alone with her two young children, that the officers did
not tell Mrs. Hudspeth that her husband had previously refused permission
to search,3 19 and that she became upset when told that her husband had been
under the totality of the circumstances the
arrested. 320 Nevertheless,
321
consent was voluntary.
Ultimately, however, the court determined that "the consent to the seizure
of the home computer was not valid because her consent cannot 'overrule'
Mr. Hudspeth's denial of consent. '32 2 Rather than holding that Randolph's
requirement that the defendant be "physically present" 323 controlled
Hudspeth's case, the panel instead focused on the broader holding that
"there is no common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right
or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another." 324 The panel
acknowledged that Randolph was not directly on point, but found that "the
same constitutional principles . .. apply regardless of whether the nonconsenting co-tenant is physically present at the residence, outside the
residence in a car, or, as in [this] case, off-site at his place of
employment. '325 The panel dismissed the idea that Matlock controlled their
decision because, unlike that case, "Hudspeth was invited to participate and
expressly denied his consent to search. '326 Recall that in Matlock, the
defendant, although present, was never asked to consent to the search and
therefore never had the opportunity to object.3 27 The Hudspeth panel thus
held that the disputed consent was the most important and controlling issue,
or where the objecting tenant was
rather than where the objection took place
328
located at the time consent was given.
The government petitioned for rehearing en banc, and the full court
overturned the panel opinion with respect to the search of Hudspeth's home
computer. 329 The court noted that, "[t]hroughout the Randolph opinion, the
majority consistently repeated it was Randolph's physical presence and
immediate objection to Mrs. Randolph's consent that distinguished
Randolph from prior case law." 330 Further, the entire premise of the
Randolph Court's social expectations theory was the assertion that "'it is
fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have
no confidence that one occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 929.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 929.
Id. at 930.
Id.

323. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519 (2006).

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 930 (quoting Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1523).
id. at 930-31.
Id. at 931.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166-67 (1974).
Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 931.
United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 959.
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to enter when afellow tenant stood there saying, "stay out. ,,,,331 Thus, the
332
court reasoned, the holding cannot apply to the Hudspeth circumstances.
Finally, the court recognized that Matlock and Rodriguez had explicitly not
been overruled on the basis that they involved defendants that were not
333
present with the opportunity to object.

Thus, finding that Randolph did not apply to Hudspeth's circumstances,
the court looked back to Matlock, which it found to support the proposition
that "the absent, expressly objecting co-inhabitant [had] 'assumed the risk'
that another co-inhabitant 'might permit the common area to be
334
searched.'
In his dissent, Judge Michael Melloy, who also wrote the Hudspeth panel
opinion, drew attention to the fact that "[t]he majority glosse[d] over the
difference between lack of consent and express objection, and instead
focuse[d] on geography, concluding that the location of a defendant, not
whether he expressly objects, is determinative." 335 The dissent's point was
that the Matlock Court did not have anything to say about "expressly
objecting" tenants because Matlock himself did not consent nor object to
the search; he was a silent party. 336 Judge Melloy therefore took issue with
the suggestion that an "absent, nonconsenting person" can be equated with
one who expressly objects. 337 He noted that, "in differentiating between
Matlock and Randolph, the Supreme Court highlighted the lack of
objection, not the lack of consent by the defendant. '338 Further, the
Randolph Court specifically noted that the police need not "'take
affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on
the permission they had already received."' 3 39 The Court was concerned
with unnecessarily infringing on police officers' ability to act in the field by
forcing them to actually seek out all tenants to ensure that consent was
universal. Judge Melloy pointed out that there was no such concern in
Hudspeth's case because his denial of consent was already on the record by
340
the time they arrived at his front door.
Judge Melloy did not ignore the Randolph Court's focus on the physical
presence of the objecting tenant, but dismissed it as an effort to deal with
the facts of that case, rather than a controlling factor. 34 1 The dissent
concluded by asserting that "[i]t seems inconceivable ...

that a core value

of the Fourth Amendment, the expectation of privacy in one's own home,
331. Id. at 959 n.4 (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1522-23 (2006)).

332. Id. at 960 (noting that the "rationale for the narrow holding of Randolph, which
repeatedly referenced the defendant's physical presence and immediate objection, is
inapplicable here").

333. See id. at 959.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. at 961 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)).
Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 962.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 962 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170).
Id.
Id. at 964 (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1527 (2006)).
Id.
Id. at 963.
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would be dependent upon a tape measure." 342 Thus, the primary
disagreement between the majority and the dissent was over whether the
controlling factor in this type of case should be the fact that a consent has
been made or, instead, the circumstances surrounding that objection. For
Judge Melloy (as well as the Ninth Circuit in Murphy) the analysis ends
when an objection is made. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Hudspeth took
the position that the objection is merely the first step in the analysis; a court
must then look to where and when the objection was made to determine if it
is valid against a co-occupant's consent.
C. The Seventh Circuit: United States v. Henderson
The police did not arrive at Kevin Henderson's home on November 26,
2003, as a result of an investigation into criminal activities. Instead,
Henderson's wife, Patricia, dialed 911 to report that her husband had
choked her. 343 Soon after she made the call, Kevin Henderson "threw her
out of the house and locked the door." 344 When police arrived at the scene,
In
Mrs. Henderson gave the officers the keys and allowed them to enter. 345 346
no uncertain terms, Kevin Henderson ordered the police out of his house.
Nevertheless, he was arrested for domestic battery and removed to the
police station. 347 Soon thereafter, Mrs. Henderson signed a written consent
to search the home. 34 8 The police recovered crack cocaine, handguns,
rifles, a crossbow, and a machete, among other things. 349 Henderson was
narcotics and
eventually charged with possession with intent to distribute 350
being a felon in possession of weapons-both federal charges.
At trial, Henderson filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from
his home, arguing that Randolph controlled because he was physically
present at the home when he objected to the officers' presence. 35 1 The
district court found the argument by the Hudspeth panel 352 to be
convincing, holding that "under the teaching of Randolph and Hudspeth the
police acted unreasonably by conducting a search based upon the later
consent of the co-tenant ...

the premises."

353

after [the] defendant had been removed from

342. Id. at 964.
343. United States v. Henderson, No. 04 CR 697, 2006 WL 3469538, at *1 (N.D. 1I.
Nov. 29, 2006), rev'd, 536 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008).

344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.

347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Kevin Henderson's Motion to Suppress Evidence, Henderson, 2006 WL 3469538
(No. 04 CR 697), 2006 WL 4734175.
352. The district court decision was made before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reversed its United States v. Hudspeth panel decision en banc.
353. Henderson, 2006 WL 3469538, at *2.
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The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that Randolph "applies only
when the defendant is both present and objects to the search of his home,"
and refusing to "read Randolph as permanently disabling [a co-occupant's]
shared authority to consent to an evidentiary search of her home." 354 The
court was in a position to consider the final decisions in both Hudspeth and
Murphy and found them to be factually "indistinguishable from each other
and from this case."' 355 The court strongly disagreed with the conclusions
of the Ninth Circuit in Murphy, which it argued allowed a "one-time
objection by one [occupant]... to permanently disable the other from ever
validly consenting to a search of their shared premises. '356 Further, it
found that the Murphy court "essentially read[] the presence requirement
'3 57
out of Randolph, expanding its holding beyond its express terms.
The court held that the social expectations theory used by the Randolph
Court was absolutely integral to that opinion and rendered the Murphy
court's decision unsupportable. The social expectations foundation of
Randolph was built around a situation where a visitor would not enter a
residence if he was met with an objection from one of the home's
occupants. The Supreme Court determined this conclusion was essentially
common sense-any "sensible person" would decline to enter. 358 The
Seventh Circuit determined that there is "no social convention that requires
the visitor to abstain from entering once the objector is no longer on the
premises; stated differently, social custom does not vest the objection with
perpetual effectiveness." 359 The Randolph rationale and holding, therefore,
is inapplicable: the Henderson court determined, as a matter of law, that a
sensible person would cease to heed the wishes of an objecting occupant
once that occupant was no longer on the premises. Overall, the Seventh
Circuit determined that it was required to observe the express limitations of
the Randolph decision and refused to apply its holding to a situation where
360
both occupants were not present at the time of objection/consent.
In her dissent, Judge Ilana Rovner pointed out what the majority had
perhaps skirted around: "There is one and only one reason that this case is
not on all fours with Georgia v. Randolph: When Kevin Henderson told the
police to 'get the fuck out' of his house, the officers arrested and removed
him instead."' 36 1 Although Judge Rovner disagreed with the majority's
conclusion, he did not go quite as far as the holding in Murphy, which
suggested that once an objection is voiced, it remains in effect until it is

354. United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776, 777 (7th Cir. 2008).
355. Id. at 783.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 784.
358. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1523 (2006).
359. Henderson, 536 F.3d at 785.
360. Id. ("[T]he Court went out of its way to limit its holding to the circumstances of the
case: a disputed consent by two then-present residents with authority.... Both presence and
objection by the tenant are required to render a consent search unreasonable as to him.").
361. Id.
at 785-86.
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voluntarily reversed, regardless of the physical location of the objector.3 62
Judge Rovner argued that "Henderson's objection survived his involuntary
removal from the home" and explicitly stated that if Henderson had
voluntarily left the residence the police would have been well within their
rights to return and obtain consent from another tenant.3 63 The Matlock
holding drew significant attention to the "assumption of risk" that a tenant
must acknowledge when he chooses to share his residence. The tenant
assumes the risk that, when he walks out the front door of his apartment, his
co-tenant might allow an unwanted guest to enter. This is the price that is
paid for the benefits of sharing a home. Rovner noted that "if he finds the
risk to his privacy unacceptable, he is free to make alternate
arrangements-to opt for a solitary abode, to choose a roommate more
attuned to his own interests, or to secure any items that he does not wish a
stranger to see." 364 However, when an individual is forcibly removed from
his residence against his will, he no longer has this freedom to make
alternate arrangements. As Rovner argued, "[h]e has already done all that
he can do to protect his privacy interest-he has told the visitor to leave. ' 365
In addition, Judge Rovner disputed the majority's analysis of "social
expectations" in this type of situation, arguing that "[o]nly in a Hobbesian
world would one person's social obligations to another be limited to what
the other is present and able to enforce. '366 Instead, Rovner envisioned a
scenario whereby a visitor, knowing that the occupants disputed his entry,
would not defy convention and enter without complete permission, even if
367
the objecting tenant left.

In sum, courts have struggled to apply the rationale and tenets of
Randolph to somewhat distinguishable fact patterns. The Ninth Circuit read
Randolph broadly, suggesting that the precise location of the objecting
individual is not legally relevant and that once an objection is made a later
search is not valid. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits would confine
Randolph to its own factual circumstances and require that any objection be
made concurrently, both temporally and geographically, with a fellow
occupant's consent. Further, even if the objection is made at the right time
and from the right location, it is valid for only as long as the objector
remains on the scene. Where a defendant objects and is then validly
arrested, these courts suggest that Matlock controls, allowing police to
search if they obtain consent from an authorized individual, regardless of
the prior objection.

362. United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2008).
363. Henderson, 536 F.3d at 786-87; see also United States v. Groves, 530 F.3d 506 (7th
Cir. 2008) (holding a search valid where defendant Groves refused consent to a search of his
home but police returned several weeks later when they knew he would not be present and
obtained consent from his girlfriend).
364. Henderson, 536 F.3d at 787.

365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
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Neither of these solutions can be said to be a definitive interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit's broad reading of Randolph
is at odds with the Supreme Court's clear attempt to limit its holding to the
circumstances at issue. 36 8 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits abided by
Randolph's mandate that it only apply to the facts there at issue, but then
chose to apply Matlock, glossing over a clear and relevant difference
William Matlock did not
between that case and Hudspeth and Henderson:
369
voice an objection to the search of his home.
The circuit courts were confined by the third-party consent doctrine
developed by the Supreme Court, primarily in Matlock, Rodriguez, and
Randolph. Even though none of these cases provided a simple solution to
the issues, the courts could not-regardless of whether they had any desire
to do so-stray from the foundations of consent search jurisprudence.
While the relevant precedents are in some ways distinguishable from the
cases at issue, they could not be ignored, as they provide the basis for any
discussion of third-party consent. In short, the problem is not flawed
analysis done by one or more of the circuit courts that created the current
split, it is instead the tools the courts were required to use. Part III of this
Note advocates a break from current third-party consent search doctrine and
a reformulation of the way courts analyze these types of cases. Specifically,
Part III argues that courts should recognize a distinction between those
cases where a consent search request was made as part of an ongoing police
investigation and those where a citizen in need of assistance requested
police presence.
III. REDEFINING "CONSENT" SEARCHES AND REQUIRING
PROBABLE CAUSE

This part argues for a rejection of the rationale that formed the basis of
the Randolph decision and a reformulation of the third-party consent search
doctrine. As shown in Part II, the doctrine currently allows courts to resort
to legal theories so malleable that they can rationally come to directly
opposing decisions when faced with similar problems. Instead, courts
should apply the "test of generalizability" and begin by determining
whether police arrived at the scene as a result of their own investigations or
at the request of the third party who provided consent. Where police are
playing an adversarial, investigative role, they should be held to a higher
standard and be required to obtain a warrant based on probable cause, rather
than requesting consent from an individual who may not be aware of his
right to refuse. Alternatively, where police become involved due to an
explicit request for help from a third party with authority to consent to a
search, that individual's invitation to enter should suffice in the absence of a
warrant.

368. See supra Part I.C.3.c.
369. See supra Part I.C. I.
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A. Rejection of Randolph's Widely Held Social Expectations Analysis
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits all considered Randolph in
deciding the cases discussed above but were unable to come to a consensus.
In fact, the very nature of the Randolph decision was a significant cause of
the current conflict. First, the Randolph majority made clear that it
intended the holding to be narrow and limited to the circumstances before
it.3 70 The Court left essentially no guidance for lower courts dealing with
circumstances such as those in Murphy, Hudspeth, and Henderson. A court
taking Randolph at its word might reason as the Eighth Circuit did and fall
back to the Supreme Court's holding in Matlock,37 1 where an occupant has
assumed the risk that his fellow co-occupant will allow any common area to
be searched in his absence. 372 In order to do this, however, the court would
have to ignore the fact that William Matlock did not object to the search of
his home. 373
If Randolph stands for anything, surely it would be
recognition that an occupant's express objection is at least relevant to a
third-party consent analysis.
In fact, the Eighth Circuit panel, reviewing the same facts and precedent,
recognized that Matlock could not control where there was an express
objection, but went on to read a constitutional principle into Randolph that
is not necessarily supported by the text of the opinion. 374 In finding that the
most important aspect of Randolph was the legitimate dispute over
consent, 375 the panel seemed to ignore that the Supreme Court had
repeatedly stressed the importance of Scott Randolph's physical presence,
as well as his objection. 376 However, following this rationale to its logical
conclusion, the Supreme Court has created a rule that protects an
individual's privacy interest when it is asserted from the entryway to his
home, but only for as long as that individual remains in that entryway. If he
were to wander off to the back of the house, one reading of the Court's
precedent is that a co-tenant could usurp his privacy interest, just as if no
objection to entry had ever been made.
Finding this result somewhat absurd, courts might look to bolster their
opinion with Randolph's widely held social expectations analysis, as the
Seventh Circuit did. 37 7 Just as Randolph explained that social expectations
would require that a visitor refrain from entering a home where its two
occupants did not consent to entry, the Seventh Circuit determined that,
once the objecting occupant left the scene, a visitor would certainly feel free
to enter. 378 Neither court offered any explanation of the basis for their

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

See supra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 335-38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 322-25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 359-60 and accompanying text.
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determination. A widely held social expectation is thus whatever the court
that happens to be hearing the case determines it to be. Presumably a court
in another circuit could come to the exact opposite conclusion based on the
judge's own personal understanding of society's widely held social
expectations. The reason for this seems obvious: there is no reason to think
that people will respond to this type of situation in a uniform way. Whether
a person chooses to ignore the objections of a resident is likely to depend on
a wide variety of factors; the same person might choose to enter one day
and leave the next, depending on the circumstances of the confrontation. A
sociological analysis of individuals' reactions to these situations might be
interesting, but it is unlikely to result in a workable legal rule. 379
380
The Ninth Circuit offered yet another method of applying Randolph.
The court essentially ignored both the Supreme Court's suggestion that its
holding be confined to the facts of Randolph and the majority's widely held
social expectations analysis.
Instead of focusing on the facts that
distinguished Stephen Murphy's situation from that of Scott Randolph, 38 1
the Ninth Circuit found support for its holding in the Supreme Court's
discussion of police removing suspects to ensure they had no opportunity to
object. 382 It seems clear, however, that the officers had legitimate cause to
arrest Murphy and did not do so in order to seek consent from someone
else. 383 After the arrest, the police continued their investigation, which
included beginning the process of applying for a search warrant and
questioning the person who had rented the storage units. 384 The Supreme
Court's warning about removing suspects was intended to prevent officers
from inventing reasons to remove suspects from the scene for the sole
purpose of avoiding the Randolph rule-it surely was not intended to
prevent valid arrests and the continuation of investigations after a consent
refusal.
In sum, the circuit courts of appeals have applied Randolph selectively,
isolating aspects of the opinion that support their holding, while
downplaying or ignoring aspects that do not. This is unsurprising, given
that Randolph was intended to be applicable only to factually identical
circumstances, and therefore provided no guidance for courts dealing with
the circumstances in cases such as Murphy, Henderson, and Hudspeth.385
Because no other Supreme Court precedent speaks directly to the issue of
disputed consent, courts are left to apply an amalgamation of several
different legal theories, such as Matlock's assumption of the risk, 38 6
379. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 215, for an example of a Fourth
Amendment empirical study that sought to determine how individuals react to various police
investigatory methods.
380. See supra Part II.A.
381. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
385. See supra Part I.C.3.c.
386. See supra Part IC1.
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Rodriguez's focus on the reasonability of police behavior, 387 and
Randolph's invitation to determine widely held social expectations. 388
What is needed, however, is to step away from these precedents and
consider the issue from a different perspective.
B. Separatingthe Cases: Factually Indistinguishable?
The first step in developing a new understanding of third-party consent
searches is recognizing that not all such cases can be grouped under a single
rule. Although the Seventh Circuit found Henderson, Murphy, and
Hudspeth to be factually indistinguishable, 389 there are a number of
important differences among the cases. There is no doubt they are similar:
all involve a defendant whose refusal to consent to a search was rendered
irrelevant when the police maneuvered around it by arresting the objector
and obtaining consent from someone else. However, this broad outline
neglects distinguishing features related to how the police contact with the
defendants began and how the consent was obtained from the individual
who granted permission to search. In Hudspeth and Murphy, the police
instigated the contact with the defendants as a result of an independent
investigation. In Henderson, however, the defendant's wife called the
police to the scene to resolve a volatile and dangerous situation. Further,
the police obtained consent in Hudspeth and Murphy only after placing the
third party in a vulnerable position. Dennis Roper was placed under arrest
before he granted consent to search the storage unit, and Georgia Hudspeth
was told that an armed guard would remain in her home overnight if she
refused consent. The below sections consider these distinguishing features
in greater detail.
1. Whether the Consent Was Voluntary
As noted above, there is significant debate among scholars over the issue
of voluntary consent. 3 90 The Supreme Court requires that courts look to the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether consent was coerced. 39 1
Whether or not the individual being questioned is aware that he can refuse
consent is relevant to this analysis, but not required. 392 This standard has
become so malleable that courts regularly find consent to be voluntary even
where a suspect inexplicably grants police permission to search where he
knows contraband will be found. 393 It is perhaps not a surprise, therefore,
that the courts found Georgia Hudspeth and Dennis Roper to have given
voluntary consent, but it is nevertheless worth taking a detailed look at the
387. See supra Part I.C.2.
388. See supra Part I.C.3.a.

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117-49 and accompanying text.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
Id.
See supra notes 118, 127-38 and accompanying text.
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in light of
circumstances surrounding Hudspeth's and Roper's consent
394
arguments made by Professors Thomas, Maclin, and Strauss.
Although Georgia Hudspeth initially refused to consent to a search of her
home, and only changed her mind after being told an armed officer would
spend the night in her home if she continued to refuse, the Eighth Circuit

determined her consent to be voluntary and valid. 39 5 Hudspeth's brief to

the court paints a vivid picture of the type of interaction between the police
and citizens that can be determined to be noncoercive. 396 Initially,
Hudspeth notes that four plain-clothed police officers arrived at the
Hudspeth home after dark and that Mrs. Hudspeth had no previous
experience dealing with police officers. 3 97 Mrs. Hudspeth repeatedly stated
that she did not know whether her husband would want her to consent to a
search, and the police were aware that she had been unable to contact an
attorney for advice. 398 Of course, the officers were also fully aware that
Roy Hudspeth did not want them to search the house, but they chose instead
to inform Mrs. Hudspeth that an officer would be stationed in her living
399
room until they returned the next day with a warrant if she refused.
Although the officers explained that they did not want her to feel coerced,
did not believe she could feel more coerced
Mrs. Hudspeth replied that she
400
than she felt at that moment.
This testimony was discounted by the Eighth Circuit because it was
uncorroborated and disputed by the officers present. 40 1 Thus, the court
engaged in exactly the type of "swearing contest" envisioned by Professor
Strauss 402 and, perhaps unsurprisingly, found the testimony of the police to
be more reliable than that of Mrs. Hudspeth. The court's complaint that
Mrs. Hudspeth's claims were uncorroborated is somewhat surprising, as
there was no one present to offer corroboration, other than the police
officers that obviously had no motivation to do so. This is also an example
of police continuing to request consent after they have received a clear
objection. Professor Maclin's proposed rule would have prevented this
situation.4 03 Maclin argues that, once police have received a rejection to a
request for consent, they should be required to refrain from repeating their
request or otherwise attempting to undermine an individual's assertion of
his or her right. Clearly, this would proscribe the use of threats to
encourage someone to change his or her mind.
394. See supra notes 117-49 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 318-21 and accompanying text.
396. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 18, at 10-13.
397. Id. at 10-11.
398. Id. at 11.
399. Id. at 11-12. The officers testified that they did not think it was necessary to tell
Georgia Hudspeth about her husband's refusal to consent, nor did they think it would matter.

Id. at 12-13.
400. Id. at 12.
401. United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922, 929-30 (8th Cir. 2006), rev'd in part,affd
in part en banc, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008).

402. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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Mrs. Hudspeth was not physically coerced, nor can it fairly be said that
her will was overborne, but she nevertheless seems to have been in a
position where she consented because she felt she had no other choice. She
was in an extremely stressful situation, with four police officers in her home
and having just learned of her husband's arrest. She was unable to contact a
lawyer for advice, and she was faced with the prospect of explaining to her
young children why an armed police officer needed to spend the night in
their living room. It is difficult to describe her consent as completely
uncoerced or voluntary.
The Ninth Circuit did not discuss in detail the circumstances surrounding
Dennis Roper's consent to search the storage unit that he had allowed
Stephen Murphy to use. The court noted only that Roper arrived on the
scene and was arrested on outstanding warrants before he gave written
consent to search. 40 4 There is no indication that the police coerced Roper
into granting consent, but it is worth considering-as it is in any case where
a third party grants consent to search-his circumstances and his possible
motivations. When Dennis Roper granted consent, he was in police
custody. He claimed to have no knowledge of Murphy's activities inside
the storage facility, although he acknowledged that he had given him
permission to reside there. 40 5 Professor Strauss has argued that any
encounter with police where the officers make a request to search is
inherently coercive because of the imbalance of power between the parties
involved. 40 6 That imbalance of power must be considered to be greater in a
situation where the individual being questioned is under arrest and
potentially implicated in a drug-manufacturing operation. Roper's personal
motivations for cooperation are not clear from the record, but a person in
his position would most likely be considering how best to extricate himself
from a difficult situation, which might involve acceding to as many police
demands as possible. The question therefore is not whether Roper was in
fact coerced, but whether police should be allowed to seek consent from a
third party in such a predicament.
To be clear, there is little doubt that, under current Supreme Court
precedent, both courts of appeals correctly determined that the consent
given by Georgia Hudspeth and Dennis Roper was valid and voluntary.
The issue is whether the Supreme Court's formulation for determining
voluntary consent is in itself valid.
2. Henderson and Randolph: Consent vs. Invitation
Professors Strauss, Thomas, and Maclin raise significant questions about
the validity of the consent search doctrine as a whole. However, their
concerns cannot be said to apply to the circumstances at issue in
Henderson. In order to understand how this case differs from Hudspeth and
404. United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2008).
405. Id.
406. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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Murphy, it is important to begin the analysis at the point where the contact
between the police and the Hendersons began. In both Hudspeth and
Murphy, the police were conducting ongoing investigations when they
requested permission to search the respective premises. The police arrived
unannounced, expecting in both cases to find evidence of crimes. 407 In
Henderson, however, there was no ongoing investigation. Police arrived at
Kevin Henderson's home because he had thrown his wife out of the house
40 8
and she had walked to a neighbor's home and called the police.
Immediately after the police arrived, Patricia Henderson agreed to sign a
complaint against her husband and asked the police to place him under
arrest and search the home for weapons and drugs. 409 Therefore, the police
did not request consent from Patricia Henderson, they were instead asked to
when considered in
provide assistance. This distinction becomes important
4 10
light of Professor Rubenfeld's test of generalizability.
C. Applying the Test of Generalizability
Professor Rubenfeld's test of generalizability offers a valuable tool for
courts grappling with third-party consent cases. 4 11 The question under this
test is whether the power asserted by the police, if generalized, poses a
threat to society as a whole. Once a court declares a search in a particular
case to be legal, it licenses law enforcement officers to conduct future
searches in that same manner. Fourth Amendment analysis is therefore not
conducted from the perspective of people like Hudspeth and Murphy, who
clearly broke the law and had obvious reasons for wanting to keep the
police out; instead, "[the] Fourth Amendment is . . .violated by searches
and seizures that rob the law-abiding of their security. '4 12 The focus,
therefore, should be on how the state's actions, generalized to society as a
whole, would affect innocent citizens. Through application of this test, it
initially becomes clear that there are at least two distinct types of third-party
consent searches: (1) searches by invitation, and (2) investigative searches.
First, there are consent searches that result from a citizen requesting
police presence to handle an emergency situation, as in Randolph4 13 and
Henderson.4 14 The searches that occurred in these cases can technically be
considered "consent searches," because in both police requested and
407. Murphy, 516 F.3d at 1119 (noting that the police officer's presence was the result of

observations made during routine police business); United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922,
924 (8th Cir. 2006), revd in part, aff'd in part en banc, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting

that police arrived at Hudspeth's business after "an investigation into the sale of large
quantities of pseudoephedrine-based cold tablets").

408. Brief and Appendix for Defendant-Appellee Henderson at 6, United States v.
Henderson, 536 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1014).

409. Id.
410. See Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 131-32.

411.
412.
413.
414.

See supra notes 92-94, 241-46 and accompanying text.
Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 129.
See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 343-50 and accompanying text.
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received permission to search. In reality, however, they were "searches by
invitation," because the consenters did not merely submit to a request (or
demand) from the police to search. Instead, they actively and voluntarily
sought help from law enforcement officers, resulting in a search for, and
seizure of, dangerous contraband from their homes. Janet Randolph called
the police to her home because a domestic dispute had escalated beyond her
control. 4 15 Immediately after they arrived, she told the officers that her
husband was using cocaine and had taken their son away from the home,
which led the officers to request permission to search the home. 4 16 The
police response was not the result of an in depth investigation, but was
instead in the interest of providing the protection and safety that Janet
Randolph had taken the initiative to request. 4 17

Likewise, Patricia

Henderson called police for help after her husband choked her and threw
her out of the house. 4 18 Again, the police responded to a request for help
from a citizen and removed both a violent individual and dangerous
4 19
weapons from the home, thus providing at least temporary safety.
These "searches by invitation" are beneficial to society as a whole and
thus pass Professor Rubenfeld's test of generalizability, neatly sidestepping
the issues surrounding consent raised by Professors Strauss, Thomas, and
Maclin. 420 Janet Randolph's and Patricia Henderson's consent are relevant
but secondary issues: the more important factors are that they voluntarily
made the initial contact with the police and that they provided them with
information concerning the criminal activity within the house. 4 2 1 Whether
there was any underlying coercion in obtaining consent at the scene is
significantly undercut by the fact that there can be no question that the
initial requests to the police, which set everything in motion, were wholly
voluntary. As a society, we rely on police assistance in situations that are
too dangerous to be handled through self-help. In these situations, the
police are playing a protective, rather than adversarial, role in relation to the
individual granting consent. Under the test of generalizability, a good faith
request for police assistance that results in a search would be per se
reasonable in terms of the Fourth Amendment. This would be true even, or
perhaps especially, when it is conducted in the face of an objection from the
very person who caused the emergency requiring police presence.
In contrast, there are police investigatory consent searches, such as those
seen in Hudspeth and Murphy, where there is clearly a "rupture in personal
life instigated" 422 by the police, and the evidence that led to the officers
presence at Hudspeth's office and Murphy's storage unit was gathered
entirely by state actors (i.e., none of the occupants of the searched premises
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 343-50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 343-50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117-49 and accompanying text.
Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 136-37.
Id. at 136.
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informed the police that criminal activity was taking place within). 42 3 If
generalized, the power asserted by the police in Hudspeth and Murphy
would appear to "undermine the possibility or flourishing of personal
life" 424 in a way that it did not in either Randolph or Henderson. Further,
as Rubenfeld points out, the primary aspect of personal life that the Fourth
Amendment protects is an individual's "houses, papers, and effects. '425
The intrusion at issue in Hudspeth and Murphy therefore goes to the very
heart of the security protected by the amendment. 42 6 Inherent in the right of
security that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect is the right of the
people to exclude police, acting without a warrant based on probable cause,
427
from their homes.
In these circumstances, the police are adversaries of the individuals they
confront with consent requests, even if only indirectly. Although neither
Roy Hudspeth's wife, Georgia, nor Stephen Murphy's "landlord," Dennis
Roper, were the direct targets of the police investigations at issue in the
respective cases, they were hardly uninvolved bystanders. The police
investigation and arrest of Roy Hudspeth would have obvious effects on his
wife and family, and Dennis Roper was surely aware of his own potential
criminal liability when the police confronted him. In these circumstances,
all of the concerns raised by Professors Strauss, Thomas, and Maclin come
into play and therefore courts must treat requests for consent differently
than when a police intervention is invited. 428
Further, granting police the systematic power to enter a home without a
warrant based on probable cause, over the objection of an occupant, and
based on evidence gathered entirely by and for state actors, infringes upon
the security protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether a
co-occupant provides consent. Generalizing this assertion of power by the
police leads to situations where the police, acting entirely without probable
cause, are able to intrude upon an innocent citizen's personal life, despite
his or her explicit objection.
Where the police are in an adversarial, investigative relationship with the
subject of their consent request, a more demanding Fourth Amendment
standard should be applied. The police are not on the scene to provide
requested protection and assistance; they are instead in exactly the
investigatory, and therefore intimidating, role that Professors Strauss and
423. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
424. Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 136.
425. Id. at 130 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
426. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
427. See Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 123-25. Rubenfeld summarizes the original
purpose of the Fourth Amendment as forbidding "unparticularized, unsworn search warrants,
unsupported by probable cause." Id. at 123. The general warrants that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to abolish essentially gave the government the right to enter any
home or business based solely on some undefined suspicion. The probable cause standard
eliminated general warrants because, in order to obtain a warrant, police must have
"evidence sufficient to make a reasonable person believe.., that a particular place contains
objects pertaining to a crime." Id. at 124.
428. See supra notes 117-49 and accompanying text.
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Thomas argue prevents individuals from objecting to a request to search. 429
Hudspeth is a perfect example of the type of situation that concerned
Professor Maclin, where an individual actually does muster the strength to
refuse to consent, only to relent eventually when police refuse to accept this
answer. 430 In these situations, police officers should be required to obtain a
warrant based on probable cause in order to search.
D. RequiringProbableCausefor Investigatory Consent Requests
Although the Framers of the Fourth Amendment were unfamiliar with
modern police forces, they nevertheless designed the Fourth Amendment to
protect against an abuse of power, the general warrant, which is arguably
43 1
analogous to present-day searches conducted without probable cause.
The Fourth Amendment thus required that any warrant issued be based on
probable cause, and that the officer seeking the warrant describe with
particularity exactly what he intended to seize. 4 32 The overarching concern
that led to the Fourth Amendment was a suspicion and fear of agents of the
state with unlimited discretionary authority. 433 Currently, when police
officers request permission to search a person or a home without a warrant,
the subject of their request may refuse, but he may not know of this right,
and the police have no obligation to inform him of it.4 34 Further, refusing
permission once may not be enough; there is nothing to stop police from
continuing to ask for permission in the face of one or more denials. 43 5 This
interaction takes place in an inherently threatening environment, 436 whether
it be a surprise encounter at night involving four police officers in a
homeowner's living room 437 or a request made immediately after the
subject was placed in police custody. 438 In these circumstances, consent
leading to self-incriminating evidence is often inexplicably granted.4 39 In
the face of this, courts determine whether consent was voluntarily given by
looking at the totality of the circumstances, which often comes down to a
question of whether the defendant or the police officers are more credible
witnesses. 440 In sum, the entire process is weighted against the citizen and
in favor of the state.
The answer to this inequality is to require police to articulate probable
cause and obtain a warrant prior to an investigatory search. 44 1 In this
429. See supra notes 117-43 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 144-49, 312 and accompanying text.
431. See supra Part I.A. 1.

432. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
433. See supra Part I.A. 1.

434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118, 127-38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
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context, consent would no longer serve to legitimize an investigatory search
under the Fourth Amendment. Before police may put a citizen in a position
to relinquish "voluntarily" his right to prevent unauthorized intrusion by the
state, the officers must have developed enough of a case to convince a
magistrate to issue a search warrant.
Consent searches are well-known to be the most common warrantless
searches conducted by law enforcement, so there can be no doubt that such
a drastic rule would have an effect on police work. 44 2 The question,
however, is whether this effect would be significant and whether it would
be negative. There is support for the contention that consent requests are
primarily a method of convenience, rather than necessity, and that in most
cases officers would be fully capable of obtaining a search warrant and
avoiding the issue of consent entirely. 443 This contention is borne out in the
limited context of the cases under discussion. The officers in both Murphy
and Hudspeth had probable cause to conduct their search, 444 and in fact in
Murphy the police were in the process of obtaining warrants that would
have allowed them to search without consent. 445 The situations therefore
could have been entirely avoided by obtaining a warrant, the probable cause
for which the police had already earned through a legitimate investigation.
CONCLUSION

Randolph is of limited value because its "widely held social
expectations" foundation does not provide consistent, logical solutions to
third-party consent search issues. Individual responses to disputes over
consent to enter will naturally vary depending on the individuals and
circumstances involved. Further, Randolph adds very little to the consent
search doctrine, as it was intended only to apply to the facts at issue in that
case. However, because it is the only disputed consent case decided by the
Supreme Court, lower courts attempting to resolve third-party disputed
consent issues in cases distinguishable from Randolph are left with very
little guidance. Consequently, the current circuit split was inevitable.
The solution to this problem is to abandon the Randolph framework and
instead begin the analysis with a determination of how the interaction
between police and citizen is instigated. If the police are called to the scene
to play a protective role, a subsequent search invited by the individual in
distress should be considered per se reasonable and valid under the Fourth
Amendment. However, consent obtained from a citizen in an adversarial
position to the police, whether directly or indirectly, should be considered
442. See supra note 102.
443. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
444. United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the
evidence the police collected at Hudspeth's business provided them with probable cause to
search his home); United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that
the police were able to see an operating methamphetamine lab in plain view).
445. Murphy, 516 F.3d at 1120 ("Murphy was transported to jail and [the arresting
officer] left the scene to prepare an affidavit for a search warrant.").
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per se unreasonable unless officers obtain a search warrant based on
probable cause.

Notes & Observations

